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RELIGIOUS LAW AND CIVIL LAW:
USING SECULAR LAW TO ASSURE
OBSERVANCE OF PRACTICES WITH
RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE
KENT GREENAWALT*

I. INTRODUCTION
Civil law in the United States rarely helps to enforce religious standards or demands that people perform actions whose significance relates to
religious obligations. Yet, some American states do have such involvement with certain observances of Orthodox and Conservative Judaism.
Many states enforce kosher requirements, to which Orthodox and
some Conservative Jews adhere. The laws, which penalize fraud in the labeling of products as kosher, serve the secular interest in preventing deception of consumers. However, the laws also force the state to decide
when religious regulations have been violated.
Orthodox and Conservative Jewish divorces raise a second kind of involvement. The law pressures people to perform an act whose significance
connects with a sense of religious obligation. Jewish law does not permit a
woman who is divorced under civil law to remarry unless her husband
grants her a get. Thus, a husband may obtain a civil divorce which effectively blocks his wife's remarriage. New York has adopted statutes that
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law; A.B., Swarthmore College,
1958; B.Phil., Oxford University, 1960; L.L.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1963. I have
received extremely valuable comments and research assistance in my preparation of this Article.
Among those giving critical comments have been Samuel Fleischaker, Louis Henkin, Samuel Levine,
Nathan Lewin, Henry Monaghan, Gerald Neuman, Elaine Pagels, Carol Sanger, Marc Stem, Richard
Stone, Peter Strauss, Stephen Sugarman, David Weiss-Halivni, and students in Seminars in Church
and State in the autumns of 1995 and 1996. Galina Krasilovsky, Mark Hulbert, Troy Selvaratnam,
Paul Horwitz, Gale Dick, and Jeremy Senderowicz have assisted me greatly with their research and
reflections.
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aim to force divorcing husbands to grant gittin to their wives, and judicial
decisions in other states have a similar effect. These laws and rulings
contribute to civil equality of men and women, and they give practical
substance to the civil right to remarry. The cost is the state's interference
with what is, in a sense, a religious matter. The wife is already free under
the civil law to remarry after the civil divorce. Should the state not leave
religious performance and ideas of religious obligation to the private
realm?
These issues raise deep questions of constitutionality and wisdom. I
concentrate on constitutionality, but matters of legislative and judicial
wisdom lie in the background.
One reason why these issues warrant discussion is their practical importance. For some Jewish women, obtaining a get is vital to their prospects for a fulfilling life after civil divorce. A much larger number of Jews
observe kashrut (Jewish dietary law).
The questions I consider also have a broader significance. One crucial method to assess the validity of various general approaches to the Free
Exercise and Establishment clauses is to examine their application to concrete problems like those raised by kosher and get laws.
Religion clause law now lies in considerable uncertainty.' A brief
summary of that law places the problems I discuss here in their doctrinal
context. Neither executive government agencies nor courts may resolve
debated issues of church doctrine and practice, deciding that some conform
with a tradition and that others do not.2 If a government action is aimed
against religious practices 3 or discriminates among religious groups, 4 it is
presumptively unconstitutional, subject to a demanding compelling interest
test that few governmental measures can survive. According to the controversial 1990 decision of Employment Division v. Smith, 5 when a general
and valid law forbids behavior, religious believers have no constitutional
claim to an exemption. Legislatures may, however, make specific accommodations to religious practices, such as allowing people during worship
1.

In Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion

Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323 [hereinafter Quo Vadis], I explain this uncertainty in more detail.
The most significant development since that article has been the invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it applies to state and local governments. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997).
2.

See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
3.
4.
5.

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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services6 to ingest peyote, despite a general prohibition on using that substance.
Congress responded to the basic doctrine of Smith with the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. 7 The Act effectively reinstated the former
constitutional law, providing that individuals could engage in otherwise
forbidden behavior if a law "substantially burden[s]" their exercise of religion and does not further a compelling interest by the least restrictive
means. The compelling interest test used in free exercise cases before
Employment Division v. Smith was less demanding against the government8
than the compelling interest test of equal protection and free speech cases;
courts applying the statute have also used a somewhat more "relaxed"
compelling interest test. 9 The Act was challenged as an unjustified exercise of Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment and as violating separation of powers (by imposing an unadministrable standard on
the courts) and the Establishment Clause. In June 1997, the Supreme
Court sustained the Fourteenth Amendment challenge in City of Boerne v.
Flores,"° holding that Congress has no power under that amendment's enforcement section to impose new rights against states and localities. The
Court's theory of invalidity covers only states and localities, but some of
the opinion's language reads as if the Act as a whole is invalid, even as it
applies to federal statutes and regulations.1 1 The Court's language does
not preclude either fresh federal legislation that applies only to the federal
government or similar state legislation. 12 Moreover, states remain free to
than the Supreme
interpret their own free exercise clauses more generously
13
Smith.
in
clause
federal
the
of
construction
Court's
6.

See id. at 892.

7.

107 Stat. 1488 (codified principally at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb (Supp. V 1994)).

8.

See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).

9.

See, e.g., Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th. Cir. 1994); Steckler v. United States,

No. 96-1054, 1998 WL 28235 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1998); Bloch v. Word of Life Christian Center, 207
B.R. 944 (D. Colo. 1997).

10.
11.

117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
See, e.g., id. at 2160.

12. I discuss these matters in Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time for Constitutional
Amendment: The Limited Scope of City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 689 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Angela Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence,1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275; Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights:
State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Em-

ployment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMIP. L. REV. 1017 (1994); Ira Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith
and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism,1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259; Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions:A Response to Employment Di-

vision v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (1993).
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The state of Establishment Clause law is more amorphous. For more
than two decades the controlling test was that of Lemon v. Kurtzman:14 An
act was valid only if it was backed by a secular purpose, did not have a
primary effect that promoted or inhibited religion, and did not unduly entangle the government with religion. Justice O'Connor has suggested that
an inquiry about government endorsement of religion is the best method
for discerning unacceptable purpose or effect, 15 and a majority of the Court
has concentrated on endorsement in cases involving public displays of religious symbols. The Court, as a court, has yet to overthrow the Lemon
test. However, seven Justices have now either rejected its approach outright or have indicated that, in lieu of a single comprehensive test, more
16
discrete inquiries are called for in establishment cases.
Although Lemon as a threefold test for all occasions may be effectively dead, most Supreme Court Justices and other judges seem to believe
that results reached under that test remain a substantial guide to how cases
should be resolved. When one looks at cases decided under Lemon, one is
driven to consider the elements of its test, particularly effect and entanglement. Not only have those approaches been used to justify what the
Court has done, any defensible approach to the Establishment Clause will
also focus on unacceptable effects and improper connections between government and religion. 17 Thus, decisions under Lemon by courts at all levels retain more relevance than might be gleaned from a simple statement
that the Supreme Court has effectively abandoned the Lemon test.
Statutes and cases relating to kosher foods and the get raise important
free exercise questions, but the Establishment Clause looms as more crucial for constitutional evaluation. The particular issues I discuss provide
one perspective for assessing what courts may and should do in a postLemon regime. The inquiry is made more difficult and interesting because
the issues differ significantly from subjects the Court has mainly resolved
under Lemon.
The aspiration of this Article is not to provide a comprehensive approach to the religion clauses, using kosher and get laws as illustrations. 18
Rather, my positions on how courts should treat these laws highlight im14.

403 U.S. 602 (1971).

15.

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

16. See Quo Vadis, supranote 1, at 325-28.
17. See id. at 361-69.
18. An attempt to develop a comprehensive approach would require extensive analysis of other
legal problems, ones more typical of free exercise and establishment litigation. In Quo Vadis, supra
note 1, I come much closer to a comprehensive overview that is mainly descriptive but partly normative. In future work, I hope to develop a more comprehensive normative approach.
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portant aspects of establishment and free exercise inquiry. The analysis
reveals a number of significant questions. One is how much it matters
which of various judicial "tests" is employed. For example, will relevant
factors be significantly different for a court that asks whether the state has
endorsed a religion than for a court that asks whether a religion has been
otherwise advanced? A second question concerns special difficulties when
one minority religion may be favored over another related minority religion. Should Establishment Clause tests be affected by the minority status
of both religions? A connected question concerns denominational preference. What is a court to do if the law actually speaks in terms of one
"denomination," but members of other relevant denominations may believe that the law is appropriate? Another narrower question concerns judicial appraisal of the tenets of religious views. When should judges accept the sincere understandings of affected individuals as controlling, and
when should they seek to discernm dominant understandings of members of
a religious group? When should they decline to make such inquiries at all?
II. KOSHER LAWS
Twenty-one states and some cities have laws that are designed to see
that those who advertise their products as kosher have, in fact, observed
kosher requirements.' 9 Literally, kosher means "fit" or, for food, "suitable
for consumption." Deriving from biblical passages and rabbinical interpretations, kosher requirements concern classes of foods, ritual slaughter, and
the handling and preparation of foods. Some animals, such as pigs and
shellfish, may not be eaten under any circumstance. An animal that is regarded as clean, or tahor,2 0 must be slaughtered by a ritual slaughterer according to an approved procedure. Its blood must be immediately drained
and the meat soaked and salted to draw out remaining blood. Kosher foods
must not be stored or prepared with nonkosher foods; meat and dairy
products must be stored apart, prepared with different utensils, and eaten
21
separately.
19. Judge Lay lists 21 states with such laws. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food
Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995). These states together have a high percentage of the

country's population.
20.

Some readers of the Article have told me that tahor may refer to an animal that is ritually

"pure" for sacrificial purposes or to an animal that may be eaten. Insofar as "cleanliness" or "purity"
concerns suitability for sacrifice, a food could be kosher and unclean or impure.
21. See Stephen F. Rosenthal, Foodfor Thought Kosher FraudLaws and the Religion Clauses

of the FirstAmendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 953-54 (1997); Gerald F. Masoudi, Comment,
Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 60 U. CnI. L. REV. 667,

667-71 (1993).
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This summary of overarching principles hardly does justice to the

complexity of kosher requirements, about which, a court said in 1918,
"thousands of volumes have been written."22 For example, the knife with
which an animal is slaughtered must be free of nicks or imperfections, and
requirements for cleaning animals, and even vegetables, can be highly de-

tailed.23 As food technology advances, novel determinations must be
made, such as whether cheese can be kosher
if made from an enzyme that
24
gene.
pig's
a
from
engineered
is genetically

The three main branches of American Judaism, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, have different attitudes toward kashrut. Orthodox and a

minority of Conservatives are observant, though the Orthodox practice is
stricter in some respects. Some Reform Jews observe aspects of kashrut,

but they do not consider the rules binding.25 Judaism within the United
States is not hierarchical. Although broad agreement exists about most aspects of kosher practice, no central authority exists to settle disagreements
22. People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918). For a detailed account of
practical disputes within New York Jewish communities, see HAROLD P. GASTWIRT, FRAUD,
CORRUPTION AND HOLINESS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE SUPERVISION OF JEWISH DIETARY
PRACrICEIN NEW YORK CrrY 1881-1940, 1-123 (1974).
23. See George Robinson, Kosher and Halal Food: A Higher Authority, NEWSDAY, July 26,
1994, at B5. See, e.g., SEYMOUR SIEGAL & DAVID POLLOCK, THE JEWISH DIETARY LAWS 64-75
(1982) (a Conservative perspective); Rabbi Yaakov Weisman, The Making of an Educated Kashrus
Consumer, THE JEWISH OBSERVER, Apr. 1993, at 4-7; THE JEWISH OBSERVER, June 1993, at 36-39
(responsive correspondence indicating Orthodox perspectives).
24. This and related issues relating to biotechnology are discussed in Kathleen Day, Modern
Science Meets Ancient Ritual; Advances in Biotechnology Raise Issues About What Is Kosher, WASH.
POST, Mar. 26, 1994, at Al.
25. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 27 (1971). The basic understanding of Reconstructionist
Jews is that kosher laws, like other rituals, are cultural practices rather than binding requirements.
Mordecai Kaplan refers to them as "folkways," which may be valuable in preserving Jewish culture.
See MORDECAI KAPLAN, JUDAISM AS A CIVILIZATION: TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCI'ION OF AMERICAN
JEWISH LIFE 433 (Jewish Publication Society and Reconstructionist Press 1981) (1934). With regard
to kashrut practices, Kaplan writes that even though the requirements cannot be understood as divine
ordinances
[T]he fact remains that because of the dietary inhibitions the Jewish civilization has acquired
a high degree of distinction and dignity ....[w]hy then should not the Jews avail themselves of those of their folkways which might energize the deeply ingrained habit of transforming the act of eating, as it were, into a sacrament.
Id. at 440.
In practice, Reconstructionist Jews often follow kosher guidelines to some extent for the spiritual values they believe doing so entails. In a 1996 survey commissioned by the Jewish Reconstructionist Federation, 34% of Reconstructionist respondents said that they keep kosher as compared to
24% of Conservative Jews who affirmed that position in a recent Conservative movement survey. But
even those who keep kosher are not as concerned about technicalities as Orthodox people would be.
See ReconstructionistSurvey FindsInclusivenessAttracts, METROWEST JEWISH NEWS, Dec. 12, 1996,
at 8.
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that arise. On matters that are disputed, observant Jews follow the judgments of rabbis whom they trust.
Kosher requirements were religious in their origin and retain religious

significance. Even if the beginnings of kashrut also reflected a concern for
physical health,2 6 no one who focuses only on physical well-being would
arrive at exactly the same standards.

Nonetheless, three main groups of consumers besides religious Jews
intentionally buy kosher products. One group, including Muslims who do
not eat pork, has religious dietary restrictions similar to those of Orthodox
Jews. A second group of consumers has no religious motivation but believes that kosher products are especially carefully prepared. Vegetarians,

for example, may believe that a dairy restaurant that holds itself out as kosher is unlikely to have any meat particles in its food. A third group of

people has a taste preference for some kosher products, such as kosher
chickens. Other consumers may buy such products without realizing that
they are kosher 2 7 One estimate 8is that only about one-fourth of those who
2
buy kosher products are Jewish.
The market for kosher products in the United States is at least $2 bil-

lion to $3 billion a year.29 Since some individuals will buy only kosher
products, which cost more, sellers have an incentive to claim that nonko-

sher products are kosher. This incentive creates a considerable potential
for fraud.
Much enforcement of kosher requirements is private. For example,

the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America inspects and approves manufacturing facilities; manufacturers then advertise the approval
with a symbol 0 on their products. Local rabbis inspect stores and restaurants and guide followers about which of those observe kosher require26. Some requirements are susceptible to such an explanation. For example, unrefrigerated
meat spoils less quickly if it is salted, and, because dairy products spoil more quickly than salted meat,
mixing them could contribute to spoilage of meat.
27. Since kosher products generally cost more than alternatives, these unintentional purchasers
would usually buy similar nonkosher foods if they were easily available and the buyers learned they
were paying more than necessary.
28. See Frank Bruni, The Brave New World of Kosher; Foods Exert a Growing Appeal That
Isn't Justfor Jews, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1996, at BI [hereinafter The Brave New World] (estimating
Jews account for 29% of the kosher market); Stuart Vincent, Around the Island/Crimeand Courts/Suit
Says a N.Y. Law Is Simply Too Kosher,NEWSDAY, Nassau and Suffolk Edition, May 21, 1996, at A27.
Such estimates become less illuminating as more and more ordinary products, such as Coca-Cola, are
prepared to qualify as kosher. See id.
29. See Masoudi, supranote 21, at 667; The Brave New World, supranote 28. Stephen Rosenthal speaks of the "$35 billion dollar kosher food industry" but indicates that most of this food is purchased by consumers unaware of a product's kosher status. Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 952.
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ments.30 Such private "enforcement" by itself raises no problem of constitutionality or legislative wisdom. These problems arise only when the
state enters the picture.
When regarding the civil law's involvement, one needs to understand
the alternatives. The state could back up private enforcement with damages for trademark infringement or penalties for fraudulent claims of approval; or, the state could undertake direct enforcement with inspections
and determinations whether practices conform to kosher requirements.
An outline of these possibilities quickly reveals three points. Purely
private enforcement, with no state involvement, may be less effective than
desired. Suppose a manufacturer puts pork in its frankfurters but nonetheless uses the 0 symbol. What could the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations do? It would have to rely on publicity directed at stores and
consumers. But one can imagine the difficulties if the manufacturer uses
new brand names, or the frankfurters are sold through butchers who do not
use brand names. Purely private enforcement may be sufficient for highly
observant Jews who pay close attention to the guidance of their rabbis, but
it works less well for strangers visiting unfamiliar settings and for those
who wish to observe kosher laws without investing much personal effort.
A second point is that
ble. Some matters might
penalties when symbols of
matters might be subject to

a mix of private and state alternatives is possibe left to private enforcement aided by state
approving bodies are fraudulently used. Other
direct state enforcement. 3 1

The third point is that the methods of direct state enforcement could
vary significantly. Enforcement officials could be secular administrators
or rabbis; the state could decide what counts as kosher or accept the determinations of rabbis or Jewish organizations; the law could possibly
create a defense for those who sincerely believe their products are ko32
sher.
30. See Mark A. Berman, Note, Kosher FraudStatutes and the Establishment Clause: Are They
Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 1, 12 (1992). For difficulties that once arose when enforce.
ment was exclusively private, see GASTWIRT, supranote 22, at 1-123.
31. A possible division would be between production of meat and its subsequent handling. Private agencies may be better equipped to evaluate how animals are slaughtered and meat is initially

prepared than to monitor the handling of meat through its distribution to consumers, although much
private enforcement now does consist of inspection of individual shops by local rabbis. See Weisman,

supranote 23.
32. The law could penalize on the basis of some intermediate level of culpability, such as recklessness. The level of culpability could also vary with the elements. Insincerity might be the standard
if the nature of the food and its preparation are undisputed, and the crucial question is whether such
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Constitutional conclusions may depend on the precise scheme the

state has chosen. One question under a proper constitutional analysis is
whether a scheme with fewer troublesome features can yield adequate en-

forcement. If constitutionally doubtful aspects are not necessary for enforcement, they may render a scheme impermissible.
My discussion moves from less intrusive state involvements with kosher requirements to more intrusive ones. I ask at each stage what values

under the Establishment Clause are compromised. As I have said, if kosher laws purposefully favor some religions over others 33 (and are not jus-

tifiable as a permissible accommodation), they create a suspect classification, are subject to strict scrutiny, and are effectively invalid. Otherwise,

Lemon's elements of purpose, effect, and entanglement, as well as the
principle that civil courts may not resolve debatable matters of religious
doctrine and practice, provide guidance for decision.
A.

STATE SUPPORT OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

The most modest state involvement is reinforcing private enforcement
of kosher rules. Minimally, the state could afford the organizations whose
symbols are improperly used ordinary remedies for trademark infringe-

ment, or allow them to sue for other economic torts. The state might go
further and employ the law of criminal and civil fraud. A company that
falsely claims its product has been endorsed as kosher would be guilty of

fraud. Since the state deals similarly with other fraudulent claims of endorsement, it would neither single out religion for special treatment, nor

favor one religion over another.
Does the state's support of private enforcement impermissibly en-

force religious law? 34 One possible answer is that kosher requirements
have become an essentially secular matter: people want to eat kosher food
food is kosher. Recklessness might be the standard if the issue is whether the food in question actually conforms to a standard upon which the parties agree.
33. I include here the inquiry whether a religion is purposefully endorsed over others.
34. I do not directly address the practical worry that dealing with fraudulent claims of endorsement may be ineffective because companies could claim their products were kosher without enlisting
the supposed approval of any recognized body. Since, in this approach, the state would not decide
what is kosher, it would not regulate simple claims that food is kosher. Because many Jews who observe kosher laws are highly skeptical of claims that a product is kosher when unsupported by a recognized group, the problem with such general assertions is less than might appear. See, e.g., Carole
Paquette, Challenge to KosherLaws Raises Some DeeperIssues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at 1.
The question whether state involvement limited to false claims of endorsement is effective does
not raise constitutional doubts about that approach. However, the effectiveness of that approach may
bear on the constitutionality of greater involvement.
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for all sorts of reasons and we should no longer think of the requirements
as primarily religious.3 5 However, despite the historic and present health
benefits of eating kosher food, the amount of kosher purchases by nonJews, and the extent to which some Jews now observe kosher standards for
cultural reasons, the importance of the standards remains largely religious.
They are about ritual observance. In Judaism, culture and religion are intermingled; but the idea that kosher requirements have moved, like Santa
Claus (St. Nicholas), from being primarily religious to being predominantly secular is specious.
A second response is far more convincing. The state has a legitimate
secular interest in preventing fraud, even if people want a specific kind of
product for religious reasons. Suppose that someone sold crosses with the
claim, "Personally Blessed by the Pope." The state may properly prevent
such fraud. No doubt, some claims of religious fraud present grave problems. Officials cannot assess the truth of essentially religious claims, and
they should ordinarily not determine the sincerity of people who make
claims about their own religious experiences, such as "God has revealed
himself to me."36 But a simple determination that the Pope did not bless
particular crosses does not raise such problems, 37 nor does a determination
that a seller falsely claimed certain meat was approved by a private kosher
enforcement organization. 38 These straightforward factual judgments do
not demand religious evaluation and are undoubtedly proper for a state to
make.
A conceivable constitutional worry exists if a statute specifically forbids fraud about supposed approvals of products as kosher, rather than
leaving such fraud to be covered by general provisions. Specific prohibitions of false labeling of products as kosher might be perceived as in conflict with the Establishment Clause. However, given the wish of many
consumers to buy kosher products, statutory specification does not amount
to an endorsement or advancement of Judaism.
35.

See Shelley R. Meacham, Note, Answering to a Higher Source: Does the Establishment

Clause Actually Restrict Kosher Regulations as Ran-Day's County Kosher Proclaims?,23 SW. U. L.
REv. 639,648-49 (1994).
36. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
37. See Marc D. Stem, KosherFoodand the Law, 39 JUDAISM 390, 397-98 (1990).
38. It has been estimated that there are now more than 270 organizations certifying products as

kosher in New York State. See The Brave New World, supra note 28. Perhaps as much as 80% of
certifications are done by "the big four," of which the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations is by
far the biggest. See Paquette, supra note 34.
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B. DIREcT STATE ENFORCEMENT
Serious constitutional problems arise only when the state's involvement increases. States and cities with laws regulating kosher advertising
directly enforce kosher rules. 39 Under these laws, officials investigate and
determine whether kosher standards have been violated.
When one considers direct enforcement, it helps to distinguish the
bare minimum of any enforcement scheme from complexities that intensify constitutional doubts. The main complexities are (1) use of rabbis as
state officials responsible for enforcement, and (2) disagreements about
what is kosher. Disagreements greatly increase constitutional concerns if
defendants may be penalized despite a sincere belief that their products are
kosher. When judges and advocates have indicated that enforcement of
kosher laws is unconstitutional, they have not always been clear whether
the basic scheme of enforcement is invalid or the complexities make it so.
1. The Basic Scheme
A statute makes it illegal to advertise food as kosher that one realizes
is not kosher. New York law, which has served as a model for other states,
provides: "A person who, with intent to defraud, sells.., food... [that he]
falsely represents ... to be kosher... is guilty of a... misdemeanor .... ,40 Kosher is typically defined as being in accord with
"orthodox Hebrew religious requirements,"'" although some laws do not
make explicit reference to Orthodox Judaism.42 Is such a law constitutional?
The circumstances most favorable to that conclusion would be if enforcement were by ordinary officials and applications of the concept of kosher were easy and undisputed. Everyone agrees that pork is unacceptable
according to traditional Jewish standards. A seller who falsely claims that
meat containing pork is kosher violates the law. Does it raise problems
when the state imposes penalties for this behavior? Two possible objections are that the state decides whether someone has violated religious law
39. One exception is New Jersey, where the state legislature acted after the state supreme court
held a scheme of direct enforcement invalid. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
40. N.Y. AGRIC. &MKTS. LAW § 201-a (McKinney 1991).
41. hi
42. See Masoudi, supra note 21, at 672-73. If enforcement officials in states where the statutes
and regulations do not refer directly to Orthodox standards rely on those standards, the constitutional
analysis differs little from that for states whose laws explicitly refer to Orthodox standards.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:781

and that it favors or endorses3 one religion over other religions, and possi4
bly over nonreligious views.
The state does determine that someone has violated religious law (or
mixed religious law and cultural practice), but it refrains from any judgment about what is religiously correct and from any debatable judgment
about how religious precepts should be understood and applied. Many
Jews and others believe one should not eat pork for (at least partly) religious reasons. The state aids them in avoiding deception. It does not say
people should follow kosher requirements; it merely assists those who
have this belief in fulfilling it. A judgment that Jewish tradition treats
pork as unacceptable is grounded on precepts that derive from religion.
However, since the determination is not debatable, the government does
not intermingle in doctrine or practice as it would by taking sides on arguable issues for which it lacks competence. 4 4
Does the state favor or endorse one religion to the disadvantage of
other religions or nonreligion? One can examine this question in terms of
actual present discrimination or potential discrimination. Whether there is
some form of present favoritism turns on whether competing versions of
kosher are unprotected and on whether other similar desires to be free of
fraudulent representations are unsatisfied. Suppose that each major branch
of the Jewish faith had its own kosher standards, and the state chose to enforce only Orthodox Jewish requirements. Such a law would favor Orthodox Judaism over other branches of Judaism and would reasonably be
viewed as an endorsement of Orthodox Judaism in comparison with them
(although not in comparison with Christianity or other religions). Such a
law would probably be unconstitutional as a suspect classification. In any
event, it would unacceptably endorse or advance one branch of Judaism in
relation to others.4 5
The analysis is quite different if the standards of other Jews who observe kosher are very closely tied to Orthodox standards-if all Jews accept the Orthodox tradition as providing the measure for whether foods are
43. In earlier consideration of state support of private enforcement, the possible complaint that
the state should not forbid fraud when the reason for consumer choice is religious was rejected.
44. The same analysis applies to a determination of whether a slaughter is a ritual slaughter if
the manner in which that designation is made is straightforward.
45. Even if other branches of Judaism had distinctly different kosher standards, one might defend using Orthodox requirements in the law if they are the most strict, and other Jews could satisfy

their own ideas of kosherby buying products that meet Orthodox standards. I shall explain in the next
section the flaws with this possible defense.
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kosher.4 6 On this assumption, kosher laws would not impermissibly favor
the Orthodox over other Jews. However, a question remains whether kosher laws effectively establish an existing religious view to the exclusion
of one that might emerge as religious understandings shift. Here is an artificially stark illustration. Suppose a leader arose who claimed that Jews
should evolve a new understanding of kosher and that any food can be kosher if produced in the right spiritual environment. The leader has created
a farming and meat-producing community, in which pigs are raised and
pork is used in frankfurters. The community wishes to use the label kosher
for its frankfurters, because they have been made in the right spiritual
conditions. When the law forbids this labeling, does that mean it establishes the religious view with a traditional understanding of kosher in preference to the novel understanding?
Kosher laws are not invalid on this basis. The vast majority of consumers have a particular idea of what food is kosher; the label "kosher" is
for them a shorthand for "acceptable according to traditional Jewish standards." If the community's frankfurters were labeled kosher, without
more, that would deceive many consumers. 47 The honest desire of the
leader to usher in a new understanding of kosher does not give him a right
to mislead people who assume that a label represents the nearly universal
present understanding of what the term covers. Although a state would
violate the Free Speech Clause and both religion clauses if it tried to restrict all utterances using the term "kosher," the requirement that product
representations conform with consumers' understandings, even when these
track a particular religious view, is constitutionally permissible. One
might respond that the meaning of kosher depends on the understanding of
individual adherents and that dominant views, therefore, should not be
privileged over dissenting views. However, so long as products are placed
in markets to which all people have access, it is appropriate to have label46. On this view, other Jews may be less rigorous in their observance of kosher requirements
than Orthodox Jews, but lack (for the most part) independent standards of what counts as kosher. See
Judge Lay's opinion in Barghout v. Bureau of KosherMeat and Food Control,66 F.3d 1337, 1341 &
n.9 (4th Cir. 1995), which quotes from an amicus brief of the New Jersey Association of Reform
Rabbis et al. (representing the entire spectrum of Jewish practice) in Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v.
New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. Super. 1992). See also Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 964. Another
variation on this possibility is that standards of different groups coincide. Orthodox standards would
then reflect the standards of other groups, but not because those groups accept Orthodox standards per

se as the measure.
47. Though some consumers of kosher products may read labels for nutritional values or ingredients due to health reasons, such as heart conditions or diabetes, many consumers would not read
labels to verify a product's status as kosher. Instead, they are likely to rely solely on the term
"kosher' on the label and assume the product corresponds with their own ideas of what food is kosher.
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ing that accords with heavily dominant views, if these can be identified, to

provide the greatest protection from fraud.
Do kosher laws aid or endorse Judaism over other groups because

they provide a special protection? That depends on whether any nonJewish groups have similar needs that are disregarded. If the kosher laws gave
Jews protection not afforded other religious groups who sought similar
protection, one might reasonably speak of discrimination and a forbidden

aid to one religion-in relation to another. Further, if the state failed to assist a secular group wanting similar protection against fraud, such as strict
vegetarians, one might worry about its protecting
religious needs in com48
parison with analogous nonreligious ones.

The day may come when a legislature's failure to protect followers of
Islam in adhering to their dietary restrictions amounts to unacceptable discrimination. 49 Thus far, however, neither Muslims nor any other sizable
group (religious or secular) has sought and failed to receive the kind of
protection afforded by the kosher laws. So long as this is true, basic kosherlaws do not presently favor or endorse Judaism.
48. A counter to this worry might be that people are especially concerned about not eating food
they believe is unacceptable for religious reasons, and, therefore, the state may concentrate efforts
against fraud as to that. Federal and state governments require accuracy about ingredients that tie directly to physical well-being, but these do not bear directly on the appropriateness of enforcing kosher
laws.
49. Muslims have dietary requirements to eat foods that are halal (lawful or permitted). The
main restrictions concern meats, although alcohol and other intoxicants are prohibited. The intricacy
of restrictions governing meat resembles that found in kosher practices, with detailed analysis of the
acceptability of gelatin and of meat from animals slaughtered by Jews and Christians ("people of the
Books"). Kosher standards do not track exactly the standards of halal, and Muslims could benefit
from clearer labeling of what conforms to their standards. See generally Muhammad Munir Chandry,
Islamic Food Laws: PhilosophicalBasis and PracticalImplications, FOOD TECH., Oct. 1992, at 92,
92-93; THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTvE (The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America, Bedford Park,
Ill.) Spring 1993, at 1; id., Autumn 1993, at 1; and id., Summer 1994, at 1.
Although the precise number is disputed, there are now approximately as many Muslims as
Jews within the United States. See John Dart, New Survey Documents Muslim Population, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 24, 1995, at G3. According to one account, 16% of Jewish households follow
kosher guidelines, but 75% of Muslims in the United States "follow Halal guidelines in one form or
other." See Mazhar Hussani, Dare to Speak, THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra, Spring 1993, at 10.
If, within a state, as many or more Muslims follow halal as Jews follow kosher,and Muslims need the
kind of protection kosher laws provide for observant Jews, the potential for a claim of discrimination
exists.
However, one cannot fault state legislatures for failing to provide equal treatment at this point in
time. The population of Muslims has increased greatly in recent years. So far the main efforts in regard to halal have been to get some manufacturers to observe its standards and provide appropriate
labeling, but not to get state governments to set up regimes of enforcement. For an overview of these
efforts, see id., at 1-12; id., Autumn 1993, at 1-12; id., Summer 1994, at 1-12.
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Someone might argue that the very singling out of kosher requirements for enforcement creates a severe constitutional difficulty. 50 According to this view, the state may treat blatant lies about whether food is kosher under general fraud provisions (declining to prosecute if it is unclear
or debated whether kosher standards have been met). But creating special
statutory provisions, regulations, and enforcement divisions devoted to kosher observance is inappropriate. Such treatment of kosher standards, so
the argument goes, provides a distinctive aid to religion and seems to endorse the understanding that fraud about religious standards is uniquely
important. This argument against distinctive kosher laws has some force,
but if kosher observance involves dietary requirements of great importance
to many citizens, then the government may single them out, even if the
category it thus recognizes is one that connects to religious practice.
What is the constitutional relevance of potential discrimination? In
one recent Supreme Court case, Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet, five Justices suggested that a potential for subsequent discrimination was one reason to invalidate the legislative creation of a special school
district for a village made up entirely of members of the Satmar Hasidic
sect of Judaism. 5 1 According to the Court and Justice O'Connor, if a legislature affords such a special benefit to one religious group, there is no assurance it has afforded or will afford the same benefit to other similar
groups. Because a failure to grant a benefit is not reviewable, the courts
are not in a position to prevent legislative favoritism along religious lines,
and the existing benefit therefore is not neutral in the sense required under
the Establishment Clause.
If this theory prevails in future cases and is given a generous extension, it could threaten kosher laws. Even if no present favoritism exists,
who can be sure what legislatures will do when other similar groups press
for equal treatment? Their possible future failure to treat groups equally
may mean that the present law lacks adequate neutrality.
Strong reasons exist for supposing that this theory will not be an important basis for undermining kosher laws. As Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent in Kiryas Joel point out, many specific
legislative concessions have been granted, and the Supreme Court has approved such concessions in principle. 52 Courts have not supposed that the
50.

See Barghout,66 F.3d at 1345.

51.

See 512 U.S. 687, 702-05 (1994). See also id. at 716-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

52.

See id. at 725-27 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 745-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

For a thoughtful and more extended discussion, see Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 968-72. See also
Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality,96 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 67-68 (1996).
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possibility of some future discrimination makes such exceptions invalid;
rather they have supposed that claims of unfair treatment between groups
may be measured by courts when such claims arise. The need for legislative decisions to accommodate religious claims is all the greater because
the Supreme Court restricted constitutional free exercise rights so severely
in Employment Division v. Smith.
Typically, courts can determine claims that treatment is comparatively unfair according to equal protection and establishment criteria.
They can then extend the legislatively granted benefit to a similar group or
hold the original benefit invalid.53 Perhaps in some narrow range of circumstances, courts will be unable to identify similar groups who should
receive equal treatment, and it may be that the Justices regarded the privilege of a special school district as falling into that category. This problem
of identification, however, is usually manageable, and it should be so in
respect to restrictions on fraud about food. In summary, the mere possibility of some future legislative discrimination should not (and probably
would not) make kosher laws presently unconstitutional.
2. Troubling Complexities
Disagreements over what food is kosher and the state's reliance on
religious leaders for enforcement complicate constitutional analysis of kosher laws. Both factors influenced the New Jersey Supreme Court54 and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 55 to hold kosher enforcement laws invalid. Using the Lemon test, the New Jersey court determined that the
state's regulations unduly entangled the government with religion and also
had a principal or primary effect of advancing religion. 5 6 It said, "Our
primary ground for [holding the regulations invalid] is that [they] impose
substantive religious standards for the kosher-products industry and
authorize civil enforcement of these religious standards with the assistance
of clergy, directly and substantially entangling government in religious
matters." 57 Although some language suggested that enforcement would be
53. See, e.g., Olsen v. Lawn, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Judge Ginsburg suggested that it
may not always be simple to decide what to do about a benefit that is granted in an unconstitutionally
restrictive manner.
54. See, e.g., Ran Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d 1353.
55. See, e.g., Barghout,66 F.3d 1337.
56. See Ran Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1364-65. The court suggested that perhaps the

regulations constituted a suspect classification involving a deliberate distinction between different
religious organizations, but it "decline[d] to invoke that standard." Id.at 1359.
57.

Id. at 1355. The regulations could not be justified as an accommodation to religion, as the

dissent proposed, because they responded to no burden on religious exercise.
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impermissible, even where the content of kosher laws was undisputed,58
the court emphasized disagreement about the interpretation of laws of kashrut within Orthodox Judaism and between it and other branches of Judaism. Even if such disagreements may occur infrequently, "when they do,

they are ineluctably religious in tenor and content."59 The state would be
"one of the disputants, seeking to impose and enforce its own interpretaresolving such disputes
tion of Orthodox Jewish doctrine," and courts
60
would have to apply and interpret Jewish law.

For the court, the religious qualifications of enforcement officials
confirmed that "the regulations themselves have a principally religious
meaning." 6 1 The Chief of the Bureau of Enforcement was an Orthodox
rabbi, and an Advisory Committee, which consisted of nine Orthodox
rabbis and one Conservative rabbi, "was constituted as it was precisely because rabbis have the expertise, education, training, and religious authority
62
to interpret, apply, and enforce the regulations."
The dissenters urged that all branches of Judaism recognize Orthodox

Judaism as setting the standards for what is kosher, and that "the record
does not indicate whether the areas of disagreement are so substantial as to
render enforcement constitutionally infirm in all or substantially all instances." 63 "[T]o the extent the New Jersey regulations refer to commer58. According to Judge Handler's opinion, "the State's adoption and enforcement of the substantive standards of the laws of kashrut is precisely what makes the regulations religious, and is fatal
to the scheme." Id. at 1360. "Under the Establishment Clause, the State can neither impose religious
rules nor endorse religious norms." Id. The dissent responded, "The record contains minimal evidence regarding whether the regulations' reference to Orthodox Judaism imposes a religious standard
or whether it refers, in most instances, to a uniform, objective, and therefore secular standard for kosher food-processing." Id. at 1368-69. This sentence misleads in treating a simple, objective standard
as itself secular, but it rightly implies that the crucial issue is whether application of the standard demands a religiously informed judgment.
59. Id. at 1362.
60. Id. at 1364.
61. Id. at 1361.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1369. The dissenters argued that a statute or regulation is facially unconstitutional
"only if the constitution is necessarily violated every time the law is enforced." Id. at 1370. The dissent quotes Supreme Court language that a law is invalid on its face only if every application is invalid. This is not an inaccurate statement of the law, but it is somewhat confusing. Suppose a statute
were invalid in 90% of its potential applications, but that 10% of the applications, viewed alone,
raised no constitutional problem. The general thrust of the law would be invalid, and the difficulty of
sorting out constitutional from unconstitutional applications would itself almost certainly raise constitutional difficulties. (It would be highly unusual that the 10% would constitute a clear, distinguishable class of situations.) Such a law would be invalid on its face. Therefore, its application would be
unconstitutional even as to the otherwise regulable 10%. See generally HENRY P. MONAGHAN,
OVERBREADT-, THE SUPREmE COURT REviEv 1 (Philip B. Kurland, Gerhard Casper & Dennis J.
Hutchinson eds., 1981); Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges to State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN.
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cially-recognized and sufficiently-definite standards, they are facially

valid" and do not unacceptably entangle the state in "monitoring religious
practices."' 4 The dissent regarded the composition of the State Kosher
Advisory Committee as irrelevant, because the committee was established
by executive order and not required by the regulations. Given the prevention of consumer fraud, the dissenters did not think the regulations advanced Orthodox Judaism or created a symbolic union of government and
religion.

In a 1995 decision, three Fourth Circuit judges unanimously held
Baltimore's ordinance enforcing kosher laws to be unconstitutional. 65
Two judges adopted different theories of unconstitutionality and the

third judge embraced both. Judge Luttig, in a concurring opinion, said that
the ordinance was an impermissible discrimination in favor of Orthodox Judaism: "The various branches of Judaism define kosher differently.., and ...these differences are significant to adherents of the various sects of the faith."'66 The ordinance, by defining kosher according to
"orthodox Hebrew religious" standards, "has unquestionably expressed an

impermissible intrafaith denominational preference for Orthodox Juda67
ism."
Judge Lay disagreed, reasoning that "all of the various sects of the
Jewish faith agree that kosher standards are determined by reference to
Orthodox Jewish law." 68 Thus, the ordinance did not embody a denominational preference requiring strict scrutiny. Judge Lay proceeded to apply
L. REv. 235 (1994). The fact that some instances of kosher enforcement might be all right should not
by itself save regulations from the sort of attack mounted in New Jersey.
This conclusion is straightforward for free speech and free press cases. A law that is substantially overbroad, reaching many constitutionally protected instances of speech, is invalid altogether,
despite the unprotected character of much of the speech it regulates. Something like the free speech,
free press overbreadth approach would be relevant here. If, in a high percentage of instances, application would violate religion clause guarantees, the overall effect of a law would be to advance (or inhibit) religion or unduly entangle the state in religion, or both. The law would therefore be invalid in
all applications.
64. Ran Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1375. The regulations focused mainly on display,
identification, and verification requirements, and neither the record nor secondary sources "establish
that those disputes [over kosher food preparation] are so pervasive and substantial as to engender a
dispute over religious doctrine in the routine enforcement actions contemplated by the regulations."
Id. at 1373-74. Stephen Rosenthal argues strongly that disputes over kosher standards are relatively
few and that standards of compliance are typically straightforward. See Rosenthal, supra note 21, at
963-65.
65. See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995).
66. Id.at 1347.
67. Id.at 1348.
68. Id. at 1341 n.9. "The mere fact that various sects may have different interpretations does
not create an intra-faith dispute as to the basic meaning of what is and is not kosher." Id.
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the Lemon test.69 The ordinance itself required that the Bureau of Kosher
Meat and Food Control consist of three Orthodox Rabbis and three laymen
chosen from a list supplied by two Orthodox associations. This was an
impermissible employment of religious officials to exercise secular power,
an unacceptable entanglement of religion and government. 70 The ordinance could not have been cured by giving secular officials the power to
determine kosher violations, because such officials may not decide matters
of religious significance. 7 1 Judge Lay also concluded that the ordinance,
separate from general provisions on fraud and with its own enforcement
mechanism, 72 had a primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion because "the incorporation of the Orthodox
standard creates an impermissi73
state."
and
church
of
union
ble symbolic
The New Jersey and Baltimore cases are complex. When people
challenge an entire scheme of regulation, judges need to assess the presence of clerical enforcement officials and the importance of disputes over
kosher rules, including the relevance of a possible sincerity defense.
a. Rabbinical involvement: When the crucial state officials are
rabbis, and particularly when the law requires this, the state is dangerously
entangled with religion. This is partly because administrative judgments
are likely to be made directly on the basis of the rabbis' own religious
understandings, and because the appearance that judgments are made on
this basis is important, regardless of how the judgments are actually made.
The problem is that the state not only seems to be performing a religious
function, but it also employs religious leaders to make governmental
determinations.7 4 That is inappropriate, as shown by the Supreme Court's
75
ruling that churches may not veto liquor licenses.
69. He did not mention the extent to which the Supreme Court had abandoned the test. See
supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
70. For Judge Lay, what the ordinance required was similar to the Massachusetts law struck
down in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), which permitted churches to veto the

issuance of liquor licenses within 500 feet of their buildings.
71.

See Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1344.

72.
73.

See id. at 1346.
See id. at 1345.

74. It might be countered that rabbis simply happen to be trained experts about kosher requirements. However, the fact that rabbis are the trained experts seems to show that the objects of interpretation are essentially matters of religious law. (In all probability, the result should be the same if the
state appoints lay experts as officials who are trained in a religious tradition to make determinations
about the rules of the tradition.)

75. See Larkin, 459 U.S. 116; Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 990-98 (defending most forms of
rabbinical involvement as officials).
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Because a large aspect of practical compliance with kosher requirements involves submitting to rabbinical supervision, clerics are inextricably involved. But just as secular officials are capable of identifying
whether someone who asserts the priest-penitent privilege has been ordained, secular officials should be able to determine whether rabbinical
supervision has occurred. This determination by secular officials is not itself a constitutional problem. However, when rabbis as rabbis are the state
officials who directly determine if kosher rules have been observed or assess whether adequate rabbinical supervision has taken place, the situation
is different. Such enforcement signals that lay people may be incapable of
making the civil legal judgment. If lay people are incapable of deciding
whether kosher requirements have been observed or whether adequate
rabbinical supervision has occurred, the determinations themselves look
fundamentally religious, and therefore lie outside the domain of state
authority.
b. Disagreements about kosher standards: The crucial questions about disagreements are more complicated. Their frequency and
significance, their correlation with distinct groups, and the state's response
to them are important. Many violations of kosher laws are clearly agreed
upon, but some issues, such as the status of sturgeon and pheasant, are
State resolution of these disputes may be in statutory
disputed.
formulations and regulations, as well as through individual administrative
determinations. Officials may implicitly take sides by their enforcement
activities, even if these fall short of formal decision.
Any statute (or regnlation) that refers explicitly to Orthodox understanding appears to align the state with Orthodox positions against competing nonOrthodox views. I shall initially assume that a state carries out
such language in its literal sense, treating as nonkosher products that Orthodox Jews generally believe are not kosher but which most Conservatives accept as kosher, such as sturgeon and pheasant.
If the state takes a position on such issues in dispute, does it not make
an essentially religious judgment? One way to avoid this conclusion
would be to say instead that the state rests on consumer understanding of
what counts as kosher, an idea used in response to the earlier example of a
reformer's revolutionary new conception of kosher. If Conservatives are
less observant in some respects than Orthodox, but accept Orthodox standards for what counts as kosher, using Orthodox standards of what is kosher could fit broad consumer understanding. If this were true, then the
state would not be making any religious judgment in following the Ortho-
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dox position. 76 Difficulties arise when Conservatives have a different understanding of whether something really is kosher than the Orthodox and

conceive their understanding as conforming with that of many consumers.
When Conservatives have this attitude about their own standards, the
state's adoption of Orthodox standards would be one-sided and, depending
might be
on the number of Conservatives who observe kosher standards,
78
impossible to justify77 in existing consumer assumptions.
Why is state endorsement of Orthodox views troubling when Orthodox and Conservative Jews disagree? The most stark conflict is not involved. Conservatives do not find food that meets Orthodox standards unacceptable to eat. They can buy products meeting Orthodox requirements
and be safe. For matters like wine, Conservatives can disregard kosher la-

beling, since they believe all wines are suitable to drink.
The problem is that Conservatives may observe some restrictions
while wanting to use a broader range of products than Orthodox find ac-

ceptable.79 But the state gives them no help in drawing their line between
kosher and nonkosher when it differs from that of the Orthodox. With the
benefit of a similar process of state certification, Conservatives might
76. This conclusion might also hold if Conservatives saw themselves as proposing novel views
about kashrut (less drastic but conceptually similar to the hypothetical reformer's view that pork is
acceptable).
77. In JACK NVERTHEIMER, A PEOPLE DIVIDED: JUDAISM INCONTEMPORARY AMERICA 162-67
(1993), a 1990 study indicates that among American Jews, 38% identified themselves as Reform, 35%
as Conservative, 6% as Orthodox, and 1% as Reconstructionist. Many Conservative Jews, however,
do not observe kosher standards.
78. There is a more complicated argument for such a basis. Suppose Conservative Jews
broadly conceive independent standards of kosher but recognize as consumers that the civil laws are
keyed to Orthodox positions. Thus, the state might claim that its standards do fit consumer understanding, and its choice of the Orthodox approach does not represent an intrinsically religious judgment The flaw with this argument, however, is its circularity. Here, consumer understanding (I am
assuming) is based on what the state has chosen to enforce in the past, not some independent understanding of what constitutes kosher observance. The state's initial choice to enforce Orthodox views
of kosher laws is not rendered nonreligious simply because nonOrthodox consumers learn what the
state is doing and take it for granted.
One possible response is that when a particular kosher law was adopted, the Orthodox view was
dominant, and the basis for consumer understanding of state labeling was set before Conservatives
were such a large group. If the factual conditions for this response could be met, the response should
nevertheless fall. The state should not be able to enforce the practices of one group indefinitely because the group was dominant when enforcement began. However, since the law could enforce accurate labeling that indicates kosher compliance by Conservative as well as Orthodox standards, it is
arguable that the state is justified in continuing existing enforcement practices until Conservatives
press for parallel enforcement of their own standards.
79. A Conservative reader has suggested that different attitudes toward mingling with nonJews
are tied to disagreements over the stringency of kosher laws, with Conservative Jews preferring more
contact than Orthodox Jews.
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achieve stricter observance of their more permissive standards. 80 The
state's adherence to Orthodox standards may discourage the development
of a Conservative tradition in which members would strictly observe their
own standards. The state, in effect, gives Orthodox Jews assistance it fails
to give Conservatives.
How does one evaluate this problem under the Supreme Court's wider
doctrinal approaches? Substantial promotion of one religion at the expense of another is unconstitutional. Whether the issue is conceived as denominational preference (calling forth strict scrutiny) or impermissible advancement of Orthodox Judaism (the second strand of the old Lemon test),
the concern is that Orthodox Judaism receives too much support under
typical kosher laws. Reform Jews might complain that kosher laws accord
recognition and prestige to Orthodox Judaism in comparison with their
branch, but since they accept no dietary requirements, any disadvantage
they suffer is too slight and oblique to matter constitutionally. 8 ' Conservative Jews who are observant have the distinctive, more powerful objection that they do not receive assistance for their own variant kosher standards similar to that the state gives Orthodox Jews.
The intensity of comparative disadvantage for Conservatives who
disagree with Orthodox standards depends on three factors, at least two of
which civil courts may determine. The first factor involves the relevant
standards of Conservatives. Where Orthodox have kosher standards and
Conservatives do not, Conservatives suffer no disadvantage. For example,
Conservatives have no difficulty following their own standards for wines,
because all wines are acceptable. The disadvantage arises when Conservatives, accepting some products Orthodox regard as nonkosher but rejecting other related ones, do not receive the help the state gives the Orthodox.
Thus, if the Orthodox regard all sturgeon as nonkosher and the law follows
Orthodox standards, Conservatives will lack guidance for which sturgeon
are prepared and handled in a manner they regard as kosher.
The second factor is the practicality of giving similar aid to Conservatives. Are Conservative standards sufficiently stable for a regime of en80. The state's reliance on Orthodox standards may tend to reinforce the view that the basic
standards of kosher are Orthodox and that Conservatives differ only by a less rigorous observance. I
am assuming that any likely costs to manufacturers, retailers, consumers, and state enforcement agencies of having standards of kosher for Conservative Jews would not justify refusing to provide that

protection.
81. Conservative Jews, whether or not they observe kosher rules, can share this complaint of
Reform Jews.
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forcement? If not, Conservatives themselves may prefer enforcement of
Orthodox standards rather than no enforcement at all.
The third factor is more amorphous. How do Conservatives regard
themselves in respect to kashrut? If they see themselves either as outright
innovators or as followers of Orthodox practice with minor deviations,
then they may not perceive kosher enforcement of Orthodox standards as
advancing Orthodoxy. Judges could assess this third factor only by appraising understandings of Conservative Jews. If these understandings differ, judges would have to determine which views are dominant among
Conservatives who observe kosher standards. A particular difficulty here
may be that official Conservative leaders are significantly more observant
than most members of Conservative synagogues. Discerning the dominant
views of a group of religious adherents is not always futile, but it hovers
uncomfortably close to making forbidden judgments about which religious
doctrines and practices are true to a tradition. For this reason, Conservative perspectives on the nature of kosher rules should play a small role, if
any, in constitutional evaluation.
One technique for understanding whether a religion is impermissibly
advanced is to ask if it is endorsed by the state. Since Christians dominate
state legislatures and lack similar dietary requirements, Christians cannot
reasonably take kosher laws as endorsing Judaism over Christianity. The
real question about endorsement is whether the state endorses Orthodox
Judaism over Conservative Judaism. So far, Justice O'Connor, the main
proponent of endorsement analysis, has opted for a test that relies on a reasonable observer with no specific religious affiliation. 82 Most nonJews are
substantially ignorant about kosher enforcement. However, with study, a
reasonable observer might be led to consider the effect of existing kosher
laws on Conservative Jews and to wonder 83 how they regard those laws. If
Conservatives reasonably feel that kosher laws represent a public statement that the authentic Judaism is Orthodox Judaism, then, especially if
the Orthodox share this view, the "observer" should reach the same conclusion.
In this context, endorsement might be viewed as a matter of degree.
Suppose most Conservatives on close examination took the following position: "We believe kosher enforcement does slightly endorse Orthodox
Judaism, but it helps us practically. On balance, we do not mind enforcement of Orthodox standards." If most Conservatives held this position, en82.

For an appraisal of her position, see Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 370-75.

83.

As my study of this subject has led me to this question.
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forcement should not be viewed as substantially endorsing Orthodox Judaism.
My analysis suggests more generally that when the issue is the possible endorsement of one minority group over another, the reasonable reactions of members of those groups should be of overarching significance.
But endorsement inquiries present the same difficulty that Conservatives'
attitudes toward their own kosher standards do. If reactions are substantially divided, a court may find it hard to achieve resolution. Outsiders can
learn how particular Conservative leaders regard kosher enforcement, but
with only a superficial knowledge of Conservative Judaism, they will have
trouble judging how most Conservative Jews who care about kosher rules
view enforcement of Orthodox standards. Still, assessment of whether
people perceive existing kosher laws as endorsing a religion other than
their own is somewhat less difficult than ascertaining their positions on
more theoretical issues.
For constitutional review of kosher regulations, the incidence of disputes may matter, both in respect to advancement of religion and the
state's entanglement in making religious determinations. Suppose 99.9%
of instances of arguable violations of kosher requirements raise simple
factual issues about undisputed standards (such as not having pork in
meat). If I am correct that a basic scheme of enforcement is constitutional,
marginal worries in rare cases should not alter that judgment. On the other
hand, if 25% of instances of arguable violations of kosher requirements
concern substantive disputes between Orthodox and Conservatives, a major component of enforcement efforts would involve taking sides. This defect would render the scheme, as a whole, unconstitutional.
Just how should judges calculate the relevant percentages of disputes
about the content of kosher requirements? The crucial disagreements are
over what food is kosher when enforcement of Orthodox standards leaves
Conservatives without help in enforcing their own variant standards.
Judges might estimate the percentage of these disagreements, relative to
the overall use of kosher symbols. They instead might assess instances of
such disputed standards as a percentage of cases in which many people
believe that those who manufacture and sell food have claimed to conform
to kosher requirements but have failed to do so. Finally, judges might determine the frequency with which disputes over standards arise in enforcement.
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All these approaches are relevant. The "actual enforcement" approach is simplest and reflects practical difficulties of administration.
84
However, enforcement officials may steer away from disputed standards.
A scheme that puts the state in the business of resolving debated religious
matters is troubling, and is not rendered innocuous by officials who sidestep most controversial applications. Further, enforcement of a law embodying Orthodox standards might not reveal most disputes that exist because other Jews accept different standards. For both these reasons, a
court should not stop at actual enforcement, but should also inquire how
far disputes over standards figure in patterns of kosher observance and instances of claimed violations.
These percentages of disputed instances are a central issue as to the
permissibility of laws that enforce Orthodox standards to the exclusion of
Conservative ones. Are disputed instances substantial, taking into account
the range of use of kosher symbols, the behavior of those who deal with
food, and instances of actual enforcement? If the disputed instances are
substantial, the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit were
rightly troubled by enforcement of Orthodox standards of kosher.
My conclusions about laws that enforce Orthodox standards to the
exclusion of Conservative ones involve stating an assumption, rejecting a
somewhat plausible option, and distinguishing among forms of legal challenge. The assumption is that it is possible to enforce both Orthodox and
Conservative standards when these differ. One method is for the state to
employ the option left open by the two courts that have invalidated
schemes of kosher regulation-that is, state prosecution for false claims of
private approval. If the state backs up private enforcement, sellers and
buyers of kosher food will rely on the certifications of private enforcement
agencies. These groups will hold themselves out as applying particular
standards of judgment; consumers will know whether approval is according to Orthodox or Conservative standards. Another approach is for the
state to require labeling that indicates whether food is kosher under stricter
Orthodox standards or more lenient Conservative ones. Finally, state enforcement officials might decide to accept claims that food is kosher when
those claims have substantial Conservative8 5support, even if the state statute
is cast in terms of Orthodox requirements.
84.

One reason officials may do this is precisely because they do not want the scheme of kosher

regulation to be vulnerable to constitutional attack.
85. If an easily identifiable product, such as swordfish, is labeled kosher, Orthodox consumers
who do not believe it to be kosher will not be confused. However, if the questionable product is

mixed in other food, as is gelatin, nonenforcement of stricter standards could leave Orthodox consumers without reliable guidance, except that provided by private labeling.
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Although a state might treat Orthodox and Conservative standards
similarly, there is an argument that a failure to do so does not constitute
present discrimination. The position of observant Conservatives who do
not receive enforcement of their distinctive standards might be seen analogous to that of followers of Islam. The law does not monitor claims about
Muslim dietary standards, and it could do so, but Muslims have not
pressed for such help. Kosher enforcement does not presently discriminate
against Muslims. The law similarly does not enforce Conservative Jewish
standards at variance with Orthodox standards, but if Conservatives have
not made a serious effort to get this assistance, perhaps they have weaker
standing to complain that the present law unfairly assists Orthodoxy. The
difficulty with this position is that the law explicitly, and perhaps unnecessarily, enforces only Orthodox requirements of kashrut; the preference for
Orthodox Judaism over Conservativism is much more direct than any preference over Islam.
When thinking about constitutionality, one needs to distinguish between a general challenge to the law and a challenge to the law as it applies to a seller who has self-consciously conformed to Conservative standards of kosher while violating Orthodox standards.
The seller's
individual challenge should definitely succeed. It is unconstitutional for
the state to convict those who sincerely follow widespread Conservative
understandings of kosher observance. As Marc Stem has written, "[T]he
State could not invoke the kosher food laws against someone who, in good
faith reliance on the decision of the Conservative rabbinate, sold swordfish
86
or gelatin as kosher."
Whether a general challenge should succeed, as it did in the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, is a closer question. However, I
believe that any scheme that unambiguously involves enforcement of Orthodox requirements to the exclusion of Conservative ones should fail,
since a legislature can accomplish its legitimate objectives without that
87
differentiation.
Patterns of actual enforcement suggest that in some states the focus
on Orthodox requirements is much less insistent than one might gather
from the statutory language. What if the statute or regulations lack any
86. Stern, supra note 37,at 399. See also Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 981-83.
87. See Masoudi, supra note 21, at 675-78. Another author, Abner S. Greene, has suggested
that the crucial question in a religion clause case should be whether government action advances or
inhibits religious pluralism. See Abner S.Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 295, 303 (1996). Promotion of pluralism vis-h-vis the dominant religion of Christianity cannot
justify preferences for one branch of a minority religion over another.
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reference to Orthodoxy, or despite such a reference, enforcement officials
generally accept claims of kosher grounded in compliance with the standards of Conservative rabbis, even when these clearly diverge from Orthodox practice? Despite the statutory language, the chief enforcement offi-

cial in New York, the state with the most extensive history of
enforcement,8" has suggested that distinctive Orthodox standards do not
play a crucial role in the statute's application. According to one article, he
standards but said that has
"acknowledges that state law cites 'Orthodox'
' 89
enforcement.
in
never been a consideration

When one evaluates nonenforcement against those who conform with
Conservative standards, it helps to distinguish a "sincerity defense" from
what we may call equal treatment. The theory of a "sincerity defense" is

standards, but is not guilty of
that a seller has failed to adhere to statutory 90
fraud because he believed he was complying.

Such a defense would mitigate, but not eliminate, the problem generated by a state preference for Orthodox requirements. The defense would
operate when disagreement does not concern the qualities of food or its
handling,9 ' but rather whether food of a certain character is kosher.92 A
defendant would be immunized from liability if he sincerely thought his

food was kosher and believed that his position would receive fair support
88. See Vincent, supranote 28. See also Masoudi, supra note 21, at 671-72.
89. See Vincent, supranote 28.
90. One might say that a seller who knows he is complying with Conservative standards but not
Orthodox ones cannot sincerely believe he is satisfying Orthodox requirements. However, the defense
would be based on the assumption that the relevant state of mind is whether he thinks his product is
kosher in a sense that will be relevant for many consumers.
91. In some circumstances, there may be no dispute about what constitutes compliance with
some kosher requirement. S, a seller, believes that the food he sells complies. However, officials are
sure he is mistaken and that either the manufacturer or the seller himself has done something to render
the food nonkosher. The question whether to provide a "sincere belief' defense for these situations is
not a problem of constitutional dimension; the question is no different from general questions about
fraud, false advertising, mislabeling, and misrepresentation.
92. In Ran-Day's County Kosher, the majority assumed that a sincere belief that food was kosher was not a defense if the state determined that the food was not kosher. See Ran Day's County
Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. Super. 1992). It relied on an apparent shift in the
position of the state attorney general about the possibility of such a defense. The dissenters wrote as if
good-faith reliance on the representations of suppliers would be a defense. See id. at 1367. The
Fourth Circuit in Barghout apparently accepted the construction of the Maryland Court of Appeals
that persons were not guilty under the Baltimore ordinance "who sincerely believe their food products
are kosher." Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Controls, 66 F.3d 1344 (4th Cir. 1995).
Marc Stem describes a number of cases in which courts have considered it important that statutes did
not apply to those with a belief that their products were kosher. See Stem, supra note 37, at 391-96.
Stem regards it essential for constitutional validity that enforcement officials not proceed against
people whose reasonable beliefs they conclude are mistaken. See id. at 399. See also Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 983-90.
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among rabbis. 93 A seller with the required belief would not be liable, although officials might decide his food was nonkosher.
The argument that a "sincere belief' standard obviates constitutional
difficulties is this: "If no one is punished for selling what he or she believes is kosher, the state is not enforcing one view to the detriment of another." Three remaining difficulties, however, establish that the constitutional concern of uneven enforcement is not eliminated.
The first difficulty is that officials may initially resolve whether basic
requirements have been met. If they decide S is selling kosher food, he
will not need to show his sincerity. If they decide S's food is not kosher, S
will then be forced to persuade someone that he is sincere. Further, the
group opposing S's position on what kosher is will receive endorsement of
its view. A second related difficulty is that S's efforts to convince others
that he is not lying may entail an expensive process with an uncertain end.
The third difficulty concerns the weight to be afforded state enforcement
officials' determination of kosher status on subsequent occasions. Must S
accept the state's determination once it has been rendered? Obviously S's
freedom of conviction is diminished if he must adhere to state agencies'
prior determinations of what is kosher. These difficulties reveal why a
sincerity defense does not remove constitutional problems if state determi94
nations of what counts as kosher follow Orthodox requirements.
An "equal treatment" approach is more promising. Under this approach, all claims of kosher with significant rabbinical support would be
treated as valid. It is worth pausing to emphasize that this is the approach
enforcement agencies must apply to conflicting claims among Orthodox
rabbis given a statute like New York's. Disagreement among Orthodox
Jews about kosher requirements is a fact of life. Some groups are stricter
than others, and no centralized authority exists to resolve disagreements.
When Orthodox Jews differ about kosher requirements, states cannot declare one position to be valid to the exclusion of another. 95 That course is
93. Otherwise, he would not sincerely believe the food was kosher in a sense relevant to knowledgeable consumers.
94. The Fourth Circuit concluded that a sincerity defense would not save an otherwise invalid

law. See Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1344. When courts rejected early challenges to kosher laws, they assumed that a defense of sincerity would apply. See Hygrade Provisions Co., Inc. v. Sherman, 266
U.S. 497 (1925). See also Stem, supra note 37.
95. A group that is self-consciously stricter than the great majority of Orthodox Jews could
protect themselves by having an approving organization with its own symbol that applies the stricter

standard. For a brief summary of some major lines of division among Jewish communities, see Maimon Schwarzschild, PluralistInterpretation:From Religion to the FirstAmendment, 7 J. CoNTEMP.

LEGAL IssuES 447, 456-57 (1996).
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barred by the line of cases forbidding states from deciding which among
96
competing factions is true to a religious tradition.
The "equal treatment" approach extends state neutrality to disagreements that fall mainly along Orthodox-Conservative lines. Such equal
treatment would eliminate any problem of preference, except for two possible wrinkles. The first wrinkle concerns the statutory language itself.
Does reference to Orthodox requirements itself endorse and advance
Orthodox Judaism? If enforcement is even-handed, the impact of the
bare statutory language is minimal. Moreover, the state may argue that
"Orthodox" here means only "traditional," not Orthodox as contrasted with
Conservative. These points should blunt any concern with the bare statu97
tory language.
The second wrinkle is more troublesome. For merchants, the process
of enforcement matters as much as the outcomes at the end of the day.
Someone who is being investigated not only bears expense and inconvenience, but may also lose the confidence of customers. 98 If many investigations are aimed against those who follow Conservative standards but fail
to conform to Orthodox ones, the law in practice can effectively discriminate against Conservatives though courts and high enforcement officials
ultimately may treat differing Orthodox and Conservative standards as
equally authoritative. Of course, assessing the effect of enforcement practices in this light is difficult for judges considering a constitutional challenge. However, a court should be open to the argument that discriminatory actions by enforcement officials undermine assertions that variant
kosher standards are treated equally.
C. CONCLUSION ABOUT KOSHER LAWS

The best approach to kosher rules involves state enforcement at all
feasible levels against fraudulent assertions of approval of private organizations and individual rabbis. 99 This basic scheme of direct state enforce96. See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
97. A court conceivably may strike a phrase like "Orthodox requirements" from a statute or

regulation.
98. See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 170 F.R.D. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1996);
Vincent, supra note 28. The claims in Commack challenging the New York law are instructive. The
family owners of Commack Kosher Meats said they were harassed because neither they nor their supervising rabbi was Orthodox. They were assessed a fine for violating New York kosher laws, which
was published in the Jewish press. Although the fine was later withdrawn, the publicity seriously
harmed their business.
99. See Masoudi, supra note 21, at 693-96.
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ment should also be constitutionally permissible if the necessary conditions for it exist. However, if a significant number of arguable violations
of kosher rules involve disagreements about standards between Orthodox
and Conservative Jews, and the law embodies only Orthodox standards,
direct state enforcement should be regarded as unconstitutional. Such
unequal treatment should be regarded as denominational preference. In
any event, such treatment unjustifiably promotes Orthodox Judaism at the
expense of Conservatism. Unconstitutionality is more straightforward
when clergy have heavy direct involvement in state kosher enforcement,
impermissibly entangling civil government with religious authority.
Im.THE GET
A. INTRODUCTION

Traditional Jewish divorce law can be seriously unfair to women and
is decidedly out of step with modem notions of equality. Should civil
judges intervene to combat unfairness or decline to intrude on the religious
life of citizens? Whatever its wisdom, is civil involvement unconstitutional?
Under Jewish law (halachah), a marriage may be dissolved if the
husband signs and delivers to his wife a bill of divorce, or get.10 0 Because
the procedures are complicated, the aid of a rabbinical court, or beth din, is
usually needed in practice. Typically, the get is invalid if the husband
signs under duress.
The choice whether to divorce is not exclusively a husband's.1 0 1 In
some circumstances, wives have a right to divorce and their assent is now
100.

See IRVING A. BRErrownz

BETWEEN CIVIL LAW AND RELIGIOUS LAW 5-40 (1993);

E.UiOT DORFF & ARTHUR ROSErT, A LIVING TREE 512-65 (1988). Professor Breitowitz's book is a
comprehensive and careful study of the get problem; it treats in detail not only civil cases but also the
complex issues of Jewish religious law. Breitowitz has also written an article, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract,and The FirstAmendment, 57 MD. L. REV. 312 (1992), which
covers most of the same subjects in shorter compass.
A typical get written in Aramaic, says: "I release and set aside, you, my wife, in order that you
may have authority over yourself to marry any man you desire .... You are permitted to every
man .... This shall be for you a bill of dismissal, a letter of release, a get of freedom...." See Blu
Greenberg, Jewish Divorce Law. If We Must Part,Let's Part As Equals, LILITH, Summer 1977, at

26-27.
101. See BRErrowrrz, supra note 100, at 10-11 (explaining that the major shift toward equality
was under Rabbi Gershon in the tenth century). See also DAVID WERNER AMRAM, THE JEWISH LAW
OF DIVORCE IN THE BIBLE AND TALMUD (1968); ELIEzER BERKOVrrs, NOT IN HEAVEN: THE NATURE

AND FUNCTION OF HALAKHA 32-45 (1983); ZE'EV FALK, DIVORCE AcTION BY THE WIFE IN THE
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necessary for divorce. The involvement of the beth din may put substan-

tial pressure on husbands.10 2 Thus, traditional Jewish law for divorce affords some protection to wives,10 3 but a wife is still much more vulnerable
than a husband because a failure to divorce carries uneven consequences.
Because Jewish law does not recognize civil divorce, one spouse's refusal to participate in a religious divorce prevents the other from marrying
within the Orthodox and Conservative faiths. 10 4 However, a husband's re-

fusal impacts much more severely on a wife than her refusal affects him.
For example, if a husband leaves his wife and cohabits with an unmarried

woman, he violates Jewish law against polygamy,0 5 and children of the
new union do not have a reduced status. Once he divorces under Jewish

law, he may marry that partner. A wife, on the other hand, who is divorced under civil law but has not received a get is considered an agunah,
or chained (anchored) woman. If she cohabits with a man, she will be
guilty of the very serious offense of adultery; she may not marry that man
when she later receives a get. Children born of that union are deemed
mamzerim, a stigma indicating that they were born within an incestuous or
adulterous relationship. These children may not marry other Jews, except
for converts and other mamzerim. Thus, the wife who has not received a
get must either refrain from sexual involvement or commit a grave viola-

tion of Jewish law that carries a stigma for herself and any new children.
These realities create a serious problem when a husband chooses not to
grant a get to his wife or uses the power to withhold a get as a bargainMIDDLE AGES (1973); BLU GREENBERG, ON WOMEN AND JUDAISM: A VIEW FROM TRADrrION 125-45
(1981).
102. In some instances even physical compulsion has been regarded as an appropriate technique
to force husbands to agree to comply with an order of a beth din. Moses Maimonides explained that
physical compulsion is applied to force the husband to do what he truly desires-to comply with Jewish law. See BREITOWrro supra note 100, at 34-35. On the conditions that are needed for such pressure, see id. at 20-40, 103. On difficulties with the composition and power of a beth din in many circumstances, see id. at 14-17.
103. The inability of modem religious tribunals to employ some forms of pressure, most notably
physical force, contributes to the difficulties wives face. For a sketch of some methods of pressure
still available to the Jewish community, see Lisa Zomberg, Beyond the Constitution:Is the New York
Get Legislation Good Law?, 15 PACE L. REV. 703, 710-17 (1995).
104. However, there is an extraordinary procedure by which husbands are sometimes permitted
to remarry, though their wives have not consented to a divorce. See BRErrOwrrL, supra note 100, at
13; DoRFF & ROSETr, supra note 100, at 525; Paul Finkelman, A Bad Marriage:Jewish Divorce and
the FirstAmendment, 2 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 131, 141-42 (1995). Reconstructionist Jews maintain a get practice but one in which the spouses are treated equally and a wife may initiate her own
divorce if a husband does not cooperate. See WERTHERIMER, supranote 77, at 164.
105. The husband is not guilty of the "capital" crime of adultery. Polygamy, a less serious offense, was lawful in the Bible and was not forbidden until about 1000 C.E. See Schwarzschild,
supra note 95, at 454-55 (explaining the attenuated sense in which crimes were "capital" at the time of
the Talmud).
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ing chip in negotiations over property and child custody. Estimates vary
wildly, but one suggests that 15,000 Orthodox and Conservative Jewish
women are agunotin New York State. 0 6 The social problem is substantial
where the Orthodox and Conservative Jewish communities are large. The
husband's power to restrict the wife's freedom by refusing to grant a religious divorce is especially troubling when the wife is a victim of physical
abuse. 0 7 Some observers regard inequities that are embodied in get practice as symptomatic of' the
"exclusion of women from power and authority
10 8
Judaism."
in traditional
In various ways, civil judges and legislators have tried to induce husbands to give gittin to their Orthodox and Conservative wives. Except for
two difficulties, these inducements are appropriate and beneficial. One
potential difficulty is that civil force might render a get invalid as a product of duress, thus defeating the purpose of intervention.10 9 The second
potential difficulty, related to the constitutional focus of this Article, is that
civil law may trespass on religious liberty and unacceptably involve the
state in religious matters.
In discussing civil involvement in the granting of a get, I will consider
contractual enforcement, statutory protection, and judicial doctrines of
equity and tort. Although I briefly will mention some efforts to achieve
fairness for wives in Orthodox and Conservative Judaism, I will not
evaluate the merits or prospects of internal reform.
B. THE NATURE OF A GET
Is granting a get a secular or religious matter? On this delicate point,
achieving sound judgment and choosing apt terms are difficult. Testimony
by rabbis persuaded a New Jersey judge that Jewish divorce proceedings
106.

See BRErrownz, supra note 100, at 2 & n.4 (showing just how unreliable any estimate is);

Finkelman, supra note 104, at 144; Zorberg, supra note 103, at 717-18. Part of the disagreement is

over who qualifies as an agunah. Perhaps the crucial number is women who seriously want a get and
do not receive one in due course.
107. See Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish Cornmunity, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 192-203 (1995).

108.

Judith Plaskow, Jewish Feminism, The Year of the Agunah, TIKKUN, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 52.

109. The magnitude of this difficulty depends on the particular view within the Jewish community about the boundaries of acceptable pressure (and acceptable pressure from sources outside the
community). According to Breitowitz, outside pressure is acceptable when the beth din has issued n

mandate and pressure from within the community is acceptable. As he explains throughout his book,
identifying which pressure is acceptable and under what circumstances is complicated and controversial, and depends in part on the grounds for divorce. See BREiToWrWz, supra note 100, at 35-37. See
also Finkelman, supranote 104, at 167-68.
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are not essentially religious," 0 and some scholars also have urged that

position.'

No doubt, a system of law parallel to the law of the state could

conceivably be cultural and not religious."

2

If so, our Constitution's relig-

ion clauses would permit the civil law to forestall untoward consequences." 3 For some individuals, the get may be cultural in this way.
However, the great majority of Jews who regard divorce requirements as
important understand them as related to religious practice and belief. The
requirements they follow for substantially religious reasons are mandated
by Jewish law." 4 For Orthodox and Conservatives, the Jewish law of divorce, like kashrut, does have cultural aspects but these are deeply intertwined with religion. Even conceiving a line between religion and culture
is hard, since Jewish religion is so tied to cultural observance. Further, the

tribunal that typically assists in the divorce consists of rabbis or includes a
rabbi;" 5 this gives the tribunal at least a quasi-religious status. As Lawrence Marshall proposes, the get procedure is religious according to a test

justification other than the signifithat asks whether it has "any rational
116
cance that some religion puts on it."
Imagine someone resisting the conclusion that delivery of the get
concerns religious practice in the following way:
Jewish law was developed to regulate the whole life of Jewish communities. Although all of the law was believed to derive from divine revelation, one could perceive a rough division of religious from secular
subjects. Marriage and divorce were essentially secular, rabbis having
authority to marry and divorce, just as clerics have authority in common
110. See Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (NJ. Super. 1981).
111. See, e.g., J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: JudicialMisconceptions and PossibleMeans of
Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REV. 201, 202,243-44 (1984).
112. Members of a cultural group might believe that norms of the group require a certain kind of
divorce, and a failure to obtain that divorce could have consequences within the group.
113. Constitutional protection might be claimed as an aspect of freedom of association, but such
a claim would not be likely to succeed.
114. Breitowitz suggests that the classical division in halacha of commandments "between man
and God" and commandments "between man and man" is not, from the standpoint of Judaism, a distinction between "secular" and "religious" components of law. The obligatory nature of all law derives from Divine revelation. BRErroWrTz, supra note 100, at 87-88.
Many people in the United States who consider themselves to be Jewish do not regard receipt of
a get as personally important. This group includes nonreligious persons and also Reform Jews. See
DoRFF & RosMrr, supranote 100, at 527, 539. Some women who do not directly care about the get
may wish to receive one in order to avoid problems with people who do care, including potential husbands.
115. A beth din is sometimes composed of one rabbi and two lay persons. See BRErroWrrz, supra note 100, at 14.
116. Lawrence C. Marshall, The Religion Clausesand CompelledReligious Divorces: A Study in
Maritaland ConstitutionalSeparations,80 NW. U. L. REV. 204,219 (1985).
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law countries to perform marriages with civil validity. Within Jewish
law, marriage and divorce are not essentially religious; and divorce remains an essentially secular concern.
This neat argument is confused. What might be an appropriate conceptual division within a society governed by Jewish law is not a defensible perspective in societies whose separate secular law governs the marriages and divorces of all people. In contrast to societies that leave
marriage and divorce to be controlled by various religious communities,
such as modem Israel, the old Ottoman Empire, and many European
countries before the Enlightenment," 7 Jewish law by itself in the United
States has no civil consequences. A wife who does not receive a get is
harmed only because she and others have a religious and cultural sense
that the get is important. For those within the United States who care
whether a wife has obtained one, the get's significance is largely religious.
This conclusion about the significance of the get does not settle how
husbands regard the act of granting or withholding one. Do husbands see
their behavior as religious, either in the sense of being governed by spiritual or ecclesiastical considerations, or in some other sense? In certain circumstances, when Jewish law requires a husband to grant a get, many husbands will feel obligated to comply, especially if a beth din tells them it is
their duty. A husband's sense of obligation connects to his religious
identity and practice. But, for our purposes, a sense of religious obligation
to grant a get is not very important." 8 Since the state will intervene only
to encourage, not discourage, the granting of a get, the critical question
about the feelings of husbands concerns those who refuse to give their
wives religious divorces.
If a husband heading for civil divorce feels a religious obligation not
to submit the possibility of divorce to a beth din or not to give a get after a
beth din has instructed him to do so, then the state's interference would
intrude on his religious conscience. For example, a man who once was an
Orthodox Jew and who has since become an evangelical Christian might
regard any participation that recognizes the authority of Orthodox Jewish
117.

See DORFF & ROSErr, supra note 100, at 518 ("Until the end of the eighteenth century most

countries in which Jews lived placed the authority for governing Jews and for settling their disputes in
the hands of Jewish institutions.").
118. When the husband feels obligated to grant a get, state pressure in the same direction creates
no conflict. However, it is a kind of mild interference for the state to provide secular encouragements
to perform perceived religious obligations. So long as the state has adequate, secular reasons for en-

couraging the behavior, its involvement raises no serious constitutional problem.
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practices as violative of his religious conscience. 19 Still, the delivery of
the get requires no affirmation of faith or religious ceremony. Neither
cases, other published materials, nor discussion with persons familiar with
Jewish divorce practice suggest that many husbands have this kind of relig120
ious objection to the involvement of a beth din or to granting a get.
Though one atypical husband claimed that giving a get would compromise
his present religious beliefs, his offer to deliver the get if his wife invested
21
$25,000 in an irrevocable trust gave the court a basis not to believe him.1
The inquiry of whether a sense of religious obligation motivates a
husband's decision not to grant a get may be too narrow. Lacking such a
sense, a husband might nevertheless believe his refusal is part of the practice of his religion (or nonreligion) tied to his identity. That identity might
be as a Reform Jew, a Christian, or an atheist. The possibility of such 1an
22
attitude shows that a husband might have a serious religious problem
with submitting to a beth din even though he does not feel that refusal to
give a get is a religious obligation. Paul Finkelman has suggested that this
attitude will most commonly arise when a husband has shifted away from
Orthodoxy or Conservatism during his years of marriage, or when a wife
has shifted toward such traditional practice. 123 In either circumstance, a
husband whose wife regards having the get as vitally important may wish
not to participate in a procedure in which Orthodox or Conservative rabbis
have significant authority.
In summary, the acts of granting and receiving a get are not distinctively religious acts, like prayer and communal worship. Most husbands
who withhold gittin do so for nonreligious reasons. Forcing husbands to
grant a get rarely violates anyone's sense of religious obligation; it usually
119. Any situation in which a wife was forced to receive a get she did not want for reasons of
religious conscience would be parallel.
120. Husbands who have earlier agreed to execute a get or submit to rabbinic jurisdiction
"rarely, if ever, have a theological belief that is offended by their participation." BRErrowrrz, supra
note 100, at 98.

121.

See Bums v. Bums, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. 1987).

122. It might be questioned whether an atheist with no religious affiliation could have such a
problem. Compare John H. Garvey, An Anti-LiberalArgumentfor Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTENP.
LEGAL IssuEs 273, 276 (1996) ("Rejecting religion is an exercise of freedom, but it is not an exercise
of religion."), with Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsUES 313,
326-37 (1996) (asserting that religion under the Constitution includes any set of answers to religious
questions). I assume that it counts as a violation of religious conscience if an atheist is compelled to
participate in a genuine religious ceremony. Such compulsion would violate the Free Exercise Clause
or the Establishment Clause, or both.
123. See Frmkelman, supra note 104, at 146-52. Finkelman says of the husband in In re Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (111.App. Ct. 1990), "He had not been married in an Orthodox ceremony and
he truly despised Orthodox rituals and beliefs." Id. at 148.
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does not offend religious sensibilities. However, the act of granting a get
holds significance within a distinctively religious system of law (as that
system exists in the United States), and the act removes what is primarily a
perceived religious impediment to remarriage and bearing children. This
fundamental religious significance alone is enough to make state intrusion
a matter of concern under the religion clauses. The concern increases if
the husband has some significant religious objection.
The following discussion examines various legal bases for civil involvement in get practice. The analysis moves from contractual bases (the
easiest grounds to defend as constitutional) to statutory provisions, and
then to common law bases other than contract.
C. CoNTRACTUAL ENFORCEMENT
Wives sometimes rely on premarital agreements by husbands to provide gittin should their marriage end in civil divorce, or on agreements
reached during separation or civil divorce proceedings. 12 4 I shall concentrate on agreements made at the time of the marriage; if these are appropriately enforceable, then so also are agreements made when a couple has
decided to separate or divorce. "Agreements" made at the time of marriage differ in specificity and apparent force, and in the degree to which
the parties are aware of them.
1. Highly Specific Agreements
At one end of the spectrum lie agreements like that drafted in the
1970's by a commission of the Rabbinical Council of America (the major
Orthodox rabbinical group) and later withdrawn. Under a prenuptial
agreement that was a separate civil agreement, a husband and wife agreed
to give and receive a get within thirty days of civil divorce and to allow an
Orthodox beth din to arbitrate any disputes about whether they had fully
performed.12 5 The sanction for nonperformance was daily liquidated dam124. For a case involving a wife who refused a get as she had undertaken in an agreement, see
Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Fam. Ct. 1973). See also BRErrowrrz, supra note 100, at 78. In
Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992), a family court in Delaware enforced a Stipulation
of Settlement under which the husband was to cooperate with the wife in obtaining a get. The husband obtained a get from a Conservative rabbinical court. This was unsatisfactory for his Orthodox
Jewish wife, since the Conservative get would not render her free to remarry under the Orthodox faith.
The court decided that the husband, well aware of his wife's convictions, had failed to cooperate with
her when he obtained a get that was not of the kind she needed.
125. See Debbie Eis Sreter, Nothing To Lose But Their Chains: A Survey of the Aguna Problem
in American Law, 28 J. FAM. L. 703, 722-24 (1989-90). See also DORF & Ros-rr, supra note 100,
at 538 (discussing an ante-nuptial agreement that renders a marriage void if the husband does not
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ages, a consequence intended to fall short of duress that would make performance invalid. 12 6 This highly specific agreement was designed for civil
enforcement, and couples would be aware of its basic terms. Is there any
constitutional objection to civil enforcement of such an agreement?
In recognizing the authority of a beth din, a court need not resolve any
disputed questions of Jewish law. Given that Orthodox wives will not otherwise feel free to marry, and will not be regarded as divorced by the Orthodox men they would want to marry, the husband's performance of the
agreement bears on the practical value of the wife's civil right to remarry
after a civil divorce. That constitutes a sufficient secular interest in enforcing the agreement, and establishes that enforcement does not promote religion inappropriately. So long as enforcement is straightforward, a court
Supreme Court has
need not go beyond the "neutral principles of law" the
127
said may resolve disputes about church governance.
Yet, a question about ordering specific performance remains. The
state should not compel intrinsically religious acts, even if people have
agreed to perform them. Imagine that H plans to sue G, for hitting him,
but their minister persuades H to forego the suit if G will confess to the
entire congregation that he committed a serious wrong against H. G and H
sign an agreement to that effect that includes a promise by G to confess
within three weeks. A court would not order G to confess publicly in a
it would deny him the benefits of the agreement if
worship service, though
128
he does not confess.
Is specific performance beyond the pale for agreements to submit to a
beth din? Appearing before a beth din and even granting a get are not intrinsically religious for most recalcitrant husbands; civil courts may comgrant the wife a religious divorce after a civil divorce). Since most Orthodox couples have not signed
such explicit civil agreements, the potential enforcement of such agreements does not eliminate the
agunot problem for Orthodox wives. Some of the problems under Jewish law with the enforcement of

agreements are explained in BRErrowrrz, supranote 100, at 77-86, 93-96.
126. See BREITowrIz, supra note 100, at 145-50 (outlining the possible invalidity under civil
and Jewish law of "liquidated damages" and the further concern that a get that is granted to avoid such
damages may not be relevantly free).
127. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). I discuss the range of possibilities in Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off. Civil Courts and Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.

1998).
128.

Even if granting a get, or appearing before a beth din, was as religious as making the public

confession, a court should not allow benefits of an agreement to someone who has reneged on his
promise to grant a get or appear. Some courts that have been hesitant to order specific performance
have withheld benefits from the recalcitrant spouse. See, e.g., Margulies v. Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d
482 (App. Div. 1973); Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61.
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pel those acts without violating constitutional principle. 12 9 Courts order
people to donate money to churches if they have made legal agreements to
do so. Courts also may order parents to take children of divorce to worship services of a particular faith. These acts have religious significance,
but they are not as dominantly religious as confessing in a worship service.
One who appears before a beth din in connection with a divorce and executes a get need make no religious commitment or statement of faith.13
Courts should regard themselves as competent to order such an appearance. When spouses have agreed to be bound by the decision of a beth
din, civil courts should also be ready to enforce what the beth din directs if
13 1
necessary.
Shifts in a husband's religious beliefs could raise a greater concern
with specific performance. Suppose he (sincerely) says, "My religious
views have altered since my marriage agreement. Participating in a Jewish
divorce would now offend my religious conscience." Whether a court
should still order him to appear before a beth din or grant a get is debatable. Nevertheless, because the husband need not affirm beliefs or participate in typical religious acts to deliver a get, a court appropriately would
enforce a clear civil contract, making the husband do what his earlier con132
victions led him to agree to do.
2. Vague, General Understandings
At the other end of the spectrum of specificity of agreements is the
general ketubah, a part of all Orthodox and Conservative wedding ceremonies that lack a more complicated undertaking. 133 This is usually written and read in Aramaic.
129. See e.g., Waxstein v. Waxstein, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1977); Koeppel v. Koeppel,
138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Shanah D. Glick, The Agunah in the American Legal System:
Problems and Solutions, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 885, 895-96 (1992). But see Turner v. Turner,
192 So.2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Pal v. Pal, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1974).
130. See BREITowrrz, supranote 100, at 89, 195.
131. See Jennifer A. Hardin, Religious PostmaritalDispute Resolution: Jewish Marriage Contractsand Civil Courts,4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 97, 105-06 (1988). However, a court must be
wary whether its order may render the get that follows invalid under Jewish law. See BREITown,
supranote 100, at 18, 93-95. Even from the point of view of constitutional law, ordering the granting

of a get approaches somewhat more closely to an impermissible ordering of a religious act than ordering submission to a beth din.

132.

It is relevant that husbands do not commonly have genuine objections of religious con-

science to fulfilling these agreements. The difficulties courts may have sifting out the genuine objections is one reason why a court may require performance when a husband interposes a possibly genuine claim.
133. See Breitowitz, supra note 100, at 85,283-85.
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Spouses who utter a general ketubah at their marriage should not ordinarily be understood to have agreed to provide a religious divorce or
submit to a beth din.134 This is especially true when a couple cannot reasonably be supposed to be aware of that potential significance. 135 The
Court of Appeals for Arizona considered a general ketubah under which
the husband agreed to fulfill obligations to cherish and support his wife
under the "laws of Moses and Israel."'136 Starting from the premise that
"[p]rovisions of an antenuptial agreement must be sufficiently specific to
be enforceable,"' 137 the court said that "[s]uch a vague provision has no
specific terms describing a mutual understanding that husband would secure a Jewish divorce." 138 It continued, "If this court were to rule on
whether the ketubah, given its indefinite language, includes an unwritten
mandate that a husband under these circumstances is required to grant his
wife a get, we would be overstepping our authority and assuming the role
139
of a religious court."
Even if a court concluded that the husband and wife agreed to civil
law consequences, what exactly the husband must do remains a question of
the predominantly religious Jewish law. Although the usual requisites of
delivering a get are straightforward, a civil court may sometimes have
trouble deciding if a husband has fulfilled all his obligations under Jewish
law. The cases on church governance teach that secular courts should not
try to resolve difficult questions of religious law. This potential difficulty
for civil courts strengthens the conclusion that general language in a ketubah, like that in the Arizona case, should not be construed as a civilly enforceable agreement by the husband to deliver a get.140
3. Intermediate Specificity
The genuinely debatable cases arise when the ketubah is much more
concrete, but lacks both the detail and the explicit reliance on civil law
found in the agreement drafted by the commission of the Rabbinical
Council of America. Many Conservative marriages are performed with
134. See id. at 81-86, 90-91; Jodi Solovy, Civil Enforcement of Jevish Marriage and Divorce:
ConstitutionalAccommodationof a ReligiousMandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 531-33 (1966).

135. Nonetheless some courts have found such an obligation. See In re Marriage of Goldman,
554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Bums v. Bums, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. 1987).
136. See Victor v. victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
137. Id. at 901.
138. Id. at 902.
139. Id.
140. Indeed, one can understand courts reaching a contrary conclusion only because they are
influenced by the secular public policy favoring completion of the religious divorce when civil divorce occurs.
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ketubahs that fit this description. 141 The New York Court of Appeals considered one of them in Avitzur v. Avitzur. 142 At their marriage, the
Avitzurs signed a Hebrew/Aramaic ketubah, declaring their "'desire
to ... live in accordance with the Jewish law of marriage throughout
[their] lifetime"' and further agreeing "'to recognize the beth din of the
Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America"'
(a Conservative seminary) or its representatives
as having authority to counsel us in the light of Jewish tradition which
requires husband and wife to give each other complete love and devotion, and to summon either party at the request of the other, in order to
enable the party so requesting to live in accordance with the standards of
the Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We authorize
the beth din to impose such terms of compensation as it may
see fit for
143
failure to respond to its summons or carry out its decision.
A majority of the Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Division's
view that the agreement prior to the marriage was unenforceable because
the state had no further interest in the marital status of the Avitzurs after a
civil divorce. The court treated the object of the lawsuit as getting Mr.
Avitzur to appear before the beth din. The agreement was similar to other
agreements to submit disputes to a nonjudicial forum. 144 The case could
be decided by neutral principles, "without reference to any religious principle." Perhaps some of the ketubah's provisions might not be judicially
enforced, but a court may nonetheless enforce a promise to refer a dispute
to a nonjudicial forum. "In short," a court could "compel a defendant to
145
perform a secular obligation to which he contractually bound himself."
The three dissenters took a sharply different view. They regarded the
attempt to obtain a religious divorce as "a matter well beyond the authority
of any civil court." 146 They noted that the complaint contained no allegation that the ketubah would have legal significance independent of the religious ceremony (the marriage) of which it was a part. They also argued
that a definition of the wife's rights under the ketubah required "an examination into the principles and practice of the Jewish religion." Although
141. See GREENBERG, supranote 101, at 136-37 (discussing the Lieberman ketubah).
142. 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). The case and its implications are discussed illuminatingly in
BRErrowrrz, supra note 1"00, at 361-70, and Finkelman, supra note 104, at 156-58.
143. Avitzur, 446 N.E. 2d at 137.
144. In response to the claim that the obligation imposed by the ketubah arises solely from Jew-

ish religious law, the court said, "Granting the religious character of the Ketubah, it does not necessarily follow that any recognition of its obligations is foreclosed to the courts." Id. at 138.
145. Id. at 139.

146.

Id. at 142.
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the document reads as if the summons to appear must come from the beth
din, the wife argued for a construction that the husband must appear upon
her summons. The husband, in turn, claimed that he had no obligation to
appear because his earlier request for a convocation of such a body was refused. 147 The dissenters concluded, partly from the witnesses the wife
planned to offer at trial, that a court would need to delve into Jewish law to
some degree to decide whether the husband would actually have to appear
before the beth din. It therefore rejected the majority's position that the
case could be resolved on the basis of neutral principles of law.
Avitzur is a close case, as the 4-3 division reflects. The dissenters are
mistaken that procuring a religious divorce is necessarily beyond the
authority of a civil court, and their doubts that the agreement used in many
Conservative services was meant to be civilly enforceable were not well
grounded. The most disturbing point in the dissent is that civil courts may
have to interpret Jewish law even to determine whether a defendant must
appear before a beth din. The sounder view is that civil judges can enforce
a clear obligation to appear, even if they must make some reference to religious law. After all, when civil courts give effect to decisions of
authoritative religious tribunals, they must determine which religious tribunals have the authority to make decisions within religious legal systems.
Determining when religious tribunals have clear authority over parties is
not a notably greater level of involvement in religious law than determining which religious tribunals are the ultimate decision-makers within religious systems of law.
When a husband's duty to appear is debatable, civil courts face a
genuine dilemma. 148 Suppose the question of Mr. Avitzur's appearance
was troublesome under Jewish law. A civil court might declare that, since
it should not resolve debatable issues of religious procedure, it should not
enforce obligations that demand resolution of such matters. Alternatively,
the court might apply a general, neutral principle of law that favors initial
submission to an "arbitrator" when the arbitrator's jurisdiction is disputed, 149 leaving it to the arbitrator initially to resolve the dispute about
147.

The husband did not argue that the agreement made no reference to divorce, but rather that

the agreement made reference only to the obligations of a continuing marriage. Although the bare
language of the agreement does not explicitly include divorce, couples are aware that one important
purpose of the agreement is to deal with divorce.
148. Since Avitzur overturned a motion to dismiss, a stage at which everything contained in a

complaint is assumed to be true, the case does not finally decide that once testimony is given the husband will necessarily be forced to submit to the beth din.

149.

See Frst Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995); William W.

Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has
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jurisdiction in light of the body of law that applies. Probably the latter
course makes more sense here. The civil court could order a husband to
submit to beth din in some conditional way, leaving it to the beth din to

determine whether he must submit to full proceedings regarding his divorce. With this understanding, the majority has the better argument in
150
Avitzur.
D. STATUTORY PROTECTION
To date, only New York has passed legislation focused on the get.
Given the large number of Orthodox and Conservative Jews that live
within the state, the statutes have a practical importance that far exceeds
New York's status as one among fifty states. The statutory provisions also

sharply pose some constitutional issues that are closely similar to those
generated by judicial reliance on equity and tort doctrines, a reliance that
may occur in any state.
New York has adopted two measures to induce husbands to grant git-

tin to their wives.151 A 1983 statute provides that if a cleric solemnized the
marriage, a person seeking divorce must allege that he or she has taken or

will take "all steps solely within his or her power to remove any barrier to
the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce." 152 Before

a court will grant a final divorce, the plaintiff must swear that he has removed all barriers. In consent divorces both parties must file statements to
that effect. 153 If the cleric who married the couple certifies that the plain-

tiff has not taken all steps to remove barriers, the court may not enter a final divorce. The statute also provides that it does not "authorize any court
154
to determine any ecclesiastical or religious issue."
Crossed the Atlantic?, 11 No. 10 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 28 (1996). See generally Stewart E.
Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2
CARDOzO L. Rnv. 481 (1981) (stating that arbitration clauses should not be enforced where the underlying principle at issue has aims other than promoting justice between the two parties, or where one
party is peculiarly subject to imposition by the other).
150. This conclusion is reinforced by a public policy that favors freedom of remarriage for divorced people. Of course, forcing the husband to submit to the beth din is no assurance he will comply with its order. See BRErrowrIZ supra note 100, at 106.
151. The laws can require behavior of a wife as well as of a husband. However since wives refusing to receive gittin have generated little difficulty, the main force of both laws is to motivate husbands and to offset the imbalance of power.
152. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(2)(i) (McKinney 1986). For one of the decisions enforcing the
law, see Friedenbergv. Friedenberg,523 N.Y.S.2d 578,581 (App. Div. 1988).
153. These are called conversion divorces based on the spouses living apart for at least a year
pursuant to a separation agreement.
154. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 253(9) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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In 1992, New York amended its equitable distribution law in order to
cover gaps left by the original statute. 155 The 1992 law provides that
courts "shall, where appropriate" take into account barriers to remarriage
when they decide the distribution of marital property, and the amount and
duration of maintenance. Although the judicial actions this law authorizes
may already have been covered by more general "catch-all" provisions, the
legislature strongly signaled its view that a husband's persistent refusal to
obtain a get is relevant to property distribution and maintenance. 156 Because the constitutional questions the two acts raise are basically the same,
this analysis concentrates on the first law, and then turns to separate questions about the 1992 amendments.
1. New York's Preconditionfor Acquiring a Civil Divorce
The 1983 get law, by making the granting of a get a condition of receiving a civil divorce, ingeniously avoids the worry that a get obtained
under duress may be invalid under Jewish law.' 57 But the device of conditioning a benefit does not obviate constitutional problems. The state cannot ordinarily condition a benefit as important as a divorce on behavior
that the state could not compel.158
The constitutional problems would be minimal if the law were essentially secular, with some applications happening to involve religious institutions. This statute cannot be so viewed. True, the main part of the law
does not sound particularly religious, as it refers generally to removing
barriers to remarriage. 159 The law as written however, does not apply to
conceivable secular barriers to remarriage. It is limited to religious marriages, and specific authority is given to the clerics who performed the
155. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 B(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
156. Adoption of the statute closely followed a decision in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 583 N.Y.S.2d
716 (Sup. Ct. 1992), in which the court took a failure to grant a get into consideration as "any other
factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper." See Zornberg, supra note 103, at
734-35. The statute also gives some support to the conclusion that courts giving this effect to barriers
to remarriage are not behaving unconstitutionally.
157. The law does not directly force anyone to do anything. It withholds a potential benefit
rather than imposing a penalty. A husband who obtains a get in order to acquire a civil divorce apparently has not been subject to duress according to Jewish law. For a brief description of the steps
leading to the enactment of the 1983 law, see Zornberg, supranote 103, at 728-30.
158. The Supreme Court spoke of divorce as a "right" in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371

(1970).
159. One effect of such general language could be that if some other religious or cultural group
should happen to develop divorce procedures internal to the group that are very much like the get procedure, that procedure would receive equal treatment (so long as the marriage had been by religious
ceremony). Such coverage would negate worries about potential discrimination among essentially
identical procedures.
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ceremonies. Barriers to remarriage are defined as those that exist "under
the principles held by the clergyman ... who has solemnized the mar160
riage."'
Presently no group besides Orthodox and Conservative Jews has relevant barriers. The only barriers the statute covers derive from Jewish law.
Probably the basic language of the statute does not apply to Roman Catholics. 16 1 Any uncertainties on that score are removed by a section that explicitly provides, "'All steps solely within his or her power' shall not be
construed to include application to a marriage tribunal or other similar organization ... of a religious denomination which has authority to annul or
dissolve a marriage under the rules of such denomination." 162 As the governor's signing message shows, 163 the aim of the statute was to cover the
Jewish get.
Exactly when courts should cut through general statutory language to
identify narrower aims is debatable. But when a statute in fact covers religious divorce proceedings of only one religion,' 64 when it deals with
marriages entered by religious ceremonies, assigns direct authority to the
marrying cleric, and has as its undoubted impetus a concern about the
power to refrain from religious divorce within the one religion the law
covers, a court must treat the law as dealing with simply that subject.
Courts must view the 1983 law as attacking impediments to remarriage
within Jewish law.
As with kosher laws, it is helpful to consider first a minimal "basic
statutory scheme," and then investigate features that raise further complexities. The basic scheme here is that an Orthodox or Conservative
Jewish husband receives a civil divorce only if he conveys a get to his
160.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(6) (McKinney 1987).

161. Roman Catholics may suffer an impediment to remarriage that in some ways resembles the
problem with the get, except that the impediment works equally for men and women and does not depend alone on the voluntary choice of either spouse. Traditional Roman Catholics believe that marriage is always for life. The Roman Catholic Church will not recognize a marriage following a civil

divorce unless the first marriage is annulled by Church authority. The request for an annulment may
come from either party, and an annulment may be granted even if the other party refuses to participate.

Thus, the refusal of one spouse to seek an annulment would not prevent the other from acquiring an
annulment. This is true not only for defects like failures to consummate, but also when the reason for
an annulment is some fundamental lie of the party who seeks the annulment.
The statute's main provision, standing alone, might cover noncooperation in annulment pro-

ceedings that causes procedural delay.
162.
163.

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(6) (McKinney 1987).
See Edward S. Nadel, New York's Get Laws: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 27 CoLUM. J.L. &

Soc. PROBS. 55, 71 n.134 (1993).
164.

Two religions, if one counts Orthodox and Conservative Judaism separately.
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wife. 165 Assuming that a civil court may make any necessary determinations without religious judgment, would the purpose and effects of such a
law be secular or religious? If religious, would they be permissibly or inappropriately so? Relatedly, does the law endorse any religion?
The vast majority of adults marry, and most of those who are divorced want to remarry and do. 166 Children of divorce may fare better if
the spouses remarry. Certainly children denominated mamzerim suffer restrictions among Orthodox and Conservative Jews in relation to their own
future marriages. 167 This combination of strong individual wishes to remarry and the possible welfare of children forms a sufficient secular basis
for the state to want people who are civilly divorced to feel free to remarry
and to be regarded as free by prospective partners. 168 But that does not
end matters. The barrier to remarriage comes from people's sense of religious obligation and their wish to be accepted within a religious community. If the state attends to that, does that make a statute's purpose or effects inappropriate?
About purpose, the state can respond: "We would want to eliminate
such barriers wherever they appear, especially when inequality systematically favors husbands and the barriers become bargaining chips in civil divorces. Our aim does not concern religion." This argument easily estab169
lishes a secular purpose.
The possibility of improper religious effects is more serious. Indisputably, the law affects whether wives and potential marriage partners feel
an obligation not to marry based on their religious identity and practice.
Undoubtedly the law has some effect on religious practice. However, this
effect alone does not really advance or inhibit religion.
Against the concern that the law harms Orthodox and Conservative
forms of Judaism by interfering with their internal legal regimes, it is at
least a partial answer that most Orthodox and Conservative rabbis and
members want the state to encourage recalcitrant husbands to grant religious divorces, and the law was adopted in response to urgings from the
165. As I have said, the law also applies to a Jewish wife who adamantly refuses to receive a get.
The inclusion of those infrequent situations does not alter this analysis.
166. See ARTHUR J. NORTON & LOUISA F. MILLER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE IN
THE 1990's (1992).
167. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating state law that conditioned remarriage on payment of alimony and child support obligations).
169. The argument is closely analogous to the one that establishes a secular purpose for kosher
laws.
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Orthodox community. 170 The law's attention to practices of Orthodox and
or endorse those religions, since
Conservative Jews does not itself prefer
171
only they raise this divorce problem.
A more troubling question about endorsement is one we might label
"condemnation." Without doubt, "condemnation" has a constitutional
status similar to "endorsement." Cases in which Supreme Court opinions
have discussed endorsement have been ones in which a religious understanding or practice has arguably been preferred, such as a creche or cross
on public property arguably prefers Christianity. 172 Justice O'Connor, the
primary proponent of endorsement analysis, has said that the government
may not send "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders."173 Condemnation of the views of a minority, say by a public display that portrays a faith as primitive or degrading,
will send the forbidden message even more directly than the more benign
endorsement of the majority's position. Condemnation definitely can
"inhibit" the religion that it targets. One issue for a get law is whether it
impermissibly condemns traditional Jewish practice by sending the message that the husband's power to withhold a get, and the consequences that
flow from that power, are unjust.
A get law is not an impermissible condemnation for three reasons.
First, implicitly labeling one practice as unfortunate because of undesirable
secular effects is within the range of what the government may do. Ordinary criminal laws reach some practices of some religions. Effective condemnation of particular practices is an inevitable, and therefore acceptable,
aspect of government regulation. The get law is pointed more directly at
one (or two) religions, but that is because only they raise the problem the
law covers. Second, if most Orthodox and Conservative Jews welcome the
state's intervention, it is hard to conclude that the law significantly condemns their faith in some symbolic way. Third, one may view the state's
involvement as compensating for power it has removed from religious tribunals. In countries in which religious courts controlled marriage and divorce, religious courts could employ coercion that is not available to them
in modem, liberal democracies. The situation that the state now intervenes
to stop-unfettered discretion of divorcing husbands to deny gittin-is one
170.
171.

See BRErrowrrz, supra note 100, at 179.
This conclusion is similar to the one we reached about enforcement of kosher laws.

172.

See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Allegheny

County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

173.

concurring).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
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generated partly by the shift to divorce by civil authorities. Thus, what the
law mostly condemns, 174 if it condemns anything, is the regrettable consequence of religious law in combination with a diminution of authority for
religious courts. For all three reasons, the get law does not condemn Orthodox and Conservative Judaism.
Two considerations complicate the questions whether the get law
"advances," "inhibits," or endorses, religion. First, the statute may involve
a very subtle promotion of Orthodox and Conservative Judaism over Reform Judaism. Most Reform Jews reject the whole notion of separate
Jewish divorces. The statute implicitly treats that procedure as important
by inducing husbands to grant gittin. Absent state interference, the injustice of traditional get practice might generate greater discontent among
Orthodox and Conservative Jews, especially women. 17 5 To put the point
starkly, the government, by making a practice of Orthodox and Conservative Judaism more palatable, may afford indirect support to these branches
against the main branch that challenges religious divorces-Reform Juda176
ism.
Second, the law is bound to influence Orthodox and Conservative Judaism to some degree. Most obviously, the law reinforces what is often
felt as a religious obligation. According to traditional understanding (to
oversimplify), a husband should submit to a beth din and follow instructions. The state provides extra muscle to lead the husband to grant a get,
exactly what a beth din directs when a marriage is destined for civil divorce. By pushing people to perform their responsibilities within a system
of religious law, the state may aid a religion. The law may have a deeper
effect on Orthodox and Conservative Judaism. For modem sensibilities,
the plight of the agunah is a cause for concern, or even outrage. Were the
state not to involve itself at all, the pressure for reform within the more
174.

I say "mostly" because even if the religious tribunals had all the power they once had, there

would still be some injustices to wives according to modem secular values.
175. I do not mean that many people on this basis alone would reject these more traditional
forms of Judaism, but discontent with the inequities of traditional divorce practice might have an in-

fluence on people shifting to Reform Judaism as a preferable alternative. One widely accepted assumption about religion clause law is that the government should not create incentives for people to

belong to one religion or another. See Laycock, supra note 122, at 319. With some stretch, the get
law could be viewed as reducing the impact of internal practice that could otherwise be a disincentive
for some people to adhere to Orthodox or Conservative Judaism. The government thus affects what is

the "market" for choice.
176. One might respond that state involvement with the get is no different from its involvement
with kashrut: It helps people who want to observe religious requirements to do so. The difference is
that this law forces the husband to perform an act under religious law, which goes well beyond requirements that those who make and sell food not engage in fraud.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:781

traditional branches of Judaism might increase. 177 If state influence successfully combats the injustice of their present practice, Orthodox and
Conservative Judaism may have less need to change. Thus, by encouraging Orthodox and Conservative husbands to grant gittin, the state may in178
directly affect developments within those branches of Judaism.
When one compares these subtle influences on religion to the secular
interest in having civilly divorced women feel free to remarry, the religious effects of the law, rather than being "primary" or "direct and immediate," 179 are minor enough to be regarded as what the Supreme Court has
called "incidental." They should not render the law invalid.180 Similarly,
if attention to the get represents a slight "favoring" of traditional branches
of Judaism, it is far from amounting to an endorsement.
In respect to effects (and purpose), a defender of the law has another
string to his bow, claiming that if the effects are primarily religious, they
represent an acceptable accommodation to the religious exercise of the
wife.181 To be acceptable on this basis, the law must accommodate the
1 82
wife's religious exercise and impose appropriately on the husband.
Doubts about the interference with the husband are misplaced. One commentator has argued that the law indirectly coerces the husband, and that
the Supreme Court's accommodation cases do not support coercion, or coercion of religious practices."8 3 The distinction between coercion and coercion of religious practices is crucial. No accommodation case supports
coercion of genuinely religious acts, but some coercion of private individuals and enterprises has been regarded as acceptable. Strong pressure
177. One writer has suggested that all branches of Judaism should seek a common approach to
Jewish divorce. See GREENBERG, supra note 101, at 140-41.
178. There is an analogy here to a point that the Supreme Court has mentioned in cases involving aid to parochial schools. Although the religious schools themselves welcomed aid that was to be
limited to secular purposes, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the religious quality of the
schools might be unduly affected by close government supervision. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473

U.S. 402 (1985).
Because Conservative Judaism has made more considerable efforts to counter the inequitable
power of the divorcing husband, its need for further development may be less than that of Orthodox

Judaism.
179. The "direct and immediate" language was first used by the Court in Committee for Public
Educationand Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,783 n.39 (1973).
180. The analysis might change if one characterized the husband's choice not to obtain a get as

often a matter of religious conviction. Cases of men objecting to obtaining gittin as a matter of religious conscience raise further problems. But such cases are unusual enough that courts should not view

the law in generalas interfering with acts of religious conviction.
181. See Bleich, supra note 111, at 277-86.
182. For some citations and my own analysis of accommodation, see Quo Vadis, supra note 1,at
385-88.
183. See Nadel, supranote 163, at 88.
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on the typical husband is similar to coercing employers to make reasonable
accommodations to the religious requirements of employees, which the
Supreme Court has indicated is appropriate. 8 4 Since the typical husband's
refusal to grant a get is not a matter of religious obligation or serious religious concern for him, the state's "encouragement" of the grant is within
the permissible range of what an accommodation may require.
Whether the law appropriately accommodates the wife's religious exercise is more complicated. One question is whether the law aids the
wife's religious exercise. Another question is whether the law properly responds to some impediment to her religious exercise. The law helps remove a barrier that her religious sense (and that of potential husbands) imposes on her, but does this removal really increase her ability to exercise
her religion? She can adhere to her religion whether she refrains from remarriage because of her sense of religious obligation or undertakes marriage because she is free to do so. It is true that a wife without a get may
be tempted to remarry, and the law that pressures her husband to grant a
get transforms an attractive illegal act (under Jewish law) into one that is
permitted. That shift alone might be said to assist religious exercise by
eliminating a conflict of desire and obligation. 185 Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the wife can observe her obligations under Jewish law by remaining married (under that law). One writer has urged a more powerful
argument that the get law aids religious exercise:
In Judaism, marriage is central to religious life. Significant religious
obligations that are fulfilled within the domestic sphere devolve upon the
observant Jewish woman. Because freedom to enter into a Jewish marobservance, it falls
riage is important to a Jewish woman's religious
186
within the protection of the free exercise clause.
184.

See T.W.A. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The employers' acts differ from that of a hus-

band granting a get in that they have no religious significance for the employers and do not alter anyone's religious obligations. However, these differences are not critical to whether the actor is coerced
unacceptably.
185.
186.

See Zomberg, supranote 103, at 739-40.
Tanina Rostain, PermissibleAccommodations of Religion: Reconsideringthe New York Get

Statute, 96 YAI L.J. 1147, 1165-66 (1987) (citation omitted).
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A court, of course, cannot decide what is really central to Jewish religious
life, but it can accept a plausible claim that, for many traditional Jewish
women, a family is significantly part of that life. For such a woman whose
prior family is being broken by civil divorce, the opportunity to remarry is
an opportunity to participate importantly in religious life.
The accommodations that are easiest to justify are those in which the
state tries to compensate for some impediment it has caused. 187 Thus, a
military draft is an impediment to the practice of pacifist beliefs, and an
exemption for conscientious objectors is an appropriate accommodation.
Similarly, legislative permission to ingest peyote during worship services
is an appropriate accommodation in response to criminalization of the use
of peyote.
The source of the get problem is debated. On the one hand, it is said
that the problem arises from the combination of Jewish law with the civil
law of divorce. 188 On this account, the state's adoption of a uniform civil
law of divorce has generated the plight of the agunah. Others counter that
the basic problem already exists within Jewish law, as evidenced by the
extent of identical difficulties in Israel, which lacks civil divorce. 8 9 A
balanced assessment indicates that the rules of Jewish law themselves may
give rise to injustice (according to modem secular standards) when husbands refuse to divorce wives, 190 but that the state exacerbates the difficulties by allowing a civil divorce separate from a religious divorce and by
disallowing some forms of pressure religious communities historically
have employed against recalcitrant husbands. 191 Thus, one might view the
get law as responding to the contribution the civil law makes to the problem.
More importantly perhaps, not all accommodations need respond to
state-imposed impediments. 192 As I have already mentioned, employers
are required to make accommodations to the religious needs of employees.
These are accommodations to general rules of the workplace set by employers and not responses to what the government has done. Thus, the
legitimacy of accommodation does not depend on casting the state as the
187.

See Greene, supra note 87, at 306.

188.
189.

See BREiTowrrz, supra note 100, at 277.
See Finkelman, supra note 104, at 134.

190. Of course, without civil divorce the husband is not free to remarry either, but he can leave
his wife.
191. See Zornberg, supranote 103, at 739-40.
192. See Quo Vadis, supranote 1, at 385-86.
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main source of the difficulties facing Jewish wives who are civilly, but not
religiously, divorced.
One can view a basic get law as making an appropriate accommodation to the wife's religious exercise and putting acceptable pressure on
most husbands who wish not to grant a get or not to appear before a beth
din. Nevertheless, the argument that the law serves secular objectives and
that all relevant religious effects are incidental may be simpler and more
decisive than the argument that the law properly accommodates religious
exercise.
The uncommon situation in which the husband has a genuine religious sentiment that he should not give a get to his wife presents a special
issue for the statute's application, since the statute would directly interfere
with religious liberty. For such a case, it might be argued that under Employment Division v. Smith193 the husband has no special privilege based
on his religious claim. 194 But that case, which deals with a secular neutral
statute prohibiting behavior, should not be regarded as applicable to statutes that require an act of predominantly religious significance. Moreover,
New York courts (and those of other states) may employ the compelling
interest standard under their state constitution.1 95 For husbands with sub193.
194.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act invalid as it applies to states and localities).

195.

See Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct.

1993), affd, 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (App. Div. 1994) (using strict scrutiny under state law after Smith and
before the Religious Freedom Restoration Act went into effect). See also supranote 13 and accompanying text.
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stantial claims of religious conscience, 196 some version of the compelling
197
interest standard should apply.
Does the state have a compelling interest to override the husband's
claim? This is a delicate judgment. One may argue that the state has a
very strong interest in assuring equality for wives, 198 in protecting the right
to remarriage, 19 9 and in meeting serious dangers of fraud. 200 But elimina-

tion of a barrier to remarriage that arises only out of a sense of religious
tradition and obligation should not be regarded as compelling enough to
require acts that offend a person's religious identity.

When we move beyond the "basic scheme" to New York's actual
statute, we find religious elements that create extra constitutional vulner-

abilities. Even apart from the law's failure to assist wives who sue husbands for divorce, the statute benefits only some wives who need a get.
The law applies only to people who have had religious marriages, and the
196. As I indicate in Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions About Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask,
in LAW AND RELIGION: THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND THE DEMANDS OF FAITH, (Nancy Rosenblum ed., forthcoming 1999), a claim must be sincere and qualify as "religious," and the burden on
religious exercise must pass some threshold of substantiality.
One can imagine a case where a husband who sues for a civil divorce based on fault or consents
to a civil divorce wishes to have his marriage continue according to religious law. He has no interest
in remarrying, or in having sexual relations with anyone else. Since he is willing to observe the same
constraints that religious law imposes on his wife, he does not regard his failure to give her a get as
unfair in any respect. His sense of wanting the religious marriage to continue is tied to his sense of
Jewish identity. This husband's wish to decline to grant a get presents a more sympathetic case than
that of the typical husband who seeks a divorce, but without a claim of religious conscience. For such
a claim, a husband would have to believe that granting a get would be seriously wrong for him from a
religious point of view. Given the role of the beth din in the Orthodox and Conservative communities,
it seems unlikely that a husband who continues in those traditions would feel that submitting to a beth
din and complying with its directions would be seriously wrong from a religious point of view.
197. As I argue briefly in Quo Vadis, supra note 1, Smith was wrongly decided, and a state
should use the compelling interest test for its state constitution. Given the result in City of Boerne v.
Flores,I now favor state legislation similar to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
198. See Solovy, supra note 134, at 533.
199. See id. at 514-15.
200. The relation between individual acts (or refusals) based on religious sensibility and the entire statute may affect this conclusion. If one thought that in a high percentage of instances, husbands
refuse to grant gittin from religious conviction, the entire provision might properly be declared invalid. The more realistic appraisal is that instances of genuine conviction are uncommon, but that in
some larger class of cases husbands may claim religious conviction and courts will not be able to discern with confidence which claims are sincere. The manner in which courts have actually applied the
compelling interest test in the free exercise area is to reject claims of religious conscience when the
dangers of fraud are significant. Under that approach, a court might reasonably conclude that the
compelling test is satisfied if the dangers of fraud appear very high. For comment on the dangers of
acceding to self-interested claims of exemption, see Laycock, supra note 122, at 350; Ira G. Lupu, To
Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 357, 380 (1996). For this purpose, spite, as well as bargaining advantage, would count
as self-interest.
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definition of barriers is cast in terms of principles of the marrying cleric.
What of a couple who has a Reform marriage (for which the tradition of
get is not important) and then becomes Orthodox or Conservative before
the husband seeks a civil divorce? No barriers would exist according to
the principles of the rabbi who performed the marriage." 1 How the statute
applies if the marrying rabbi has shifted his religious allegiance between
the marriage and the divorce is not clear. Presumably his principles at the
time of marriage control (at least if the couple has not also shifted their
allegiance).2 02 It is doubtful how the law applies to couples married in a
civil ceremony who then become Orthodox or Conservative and go
through an appropriate marriage ceremony. 20 3 The statute covers marriages "solemnized" by a cleric. For the state, the crucial marriage is the
initial civil marriage, not the subsequent religious marriage. Nevertheless,
a generous interpretation would include a marriage "solemnized" by a
cleric after a valid civil ceremony.2 4 The failure of the law as written to
protect some women who require a get and to settle important matters of
detail is troubling, but should not undermine the statute's constitutionality.
The provision granting the marrying rabbi authority to prevent a civil
divorce by certifying that the husband has not taken all steps to remove
barriers is more intractable. The drafters probably assumed that the husband's having or not having taken necessary steps was a simple matter of
fact, with the marrying rabbi a neutral figure well placed to make the determination. However, they may also have wanted to eliminate worries
that state courts would have to discern Jewish law to see if a husband has
taken necessary steps. State courts cannot permissibly make that determination in seriously debatable cases.
Nevertheless, the statute's "solution" is inadequate. The less serious
difficulty is that, when the marrying rabbi has died or is unavailable, the
court will have to either accept at face value the husband's affidavit that he
201. Nevertheless, a New York court decided that the 1983 law applied even when the couple
had been married by a Reform Jewish rabbi, so long as the wife perceived herself as needing a get to
remarry. See Megibow v. Megibow, 612 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
The language of the statute appears to require that no barriers to remarriage exist, whether or not
either spouse cares about remarriage. In the instance of a couple who has completely left Orthodox
and Conservative Judaism, the wife usually may not care about her status under Jewish law, but there
is still a barrier under the principles of the marrying rabbi. n any event, the defendant in the divorce

can waive the statutory requirement. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(3), (4) (McKinney 1988).
202. See F'mkelman, supra note 104, at 169-70.
203. On the attitude toward civil marriages, see DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 100, at 540.
204. On the alternative reading, the law would not protect people who subsequently become Orthodox or Conservative and then have a religious ceremony.
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has eliminated any barriers to remarriage, 20 5 or make its own determination. Second and more fatally, the statute appears to give the rabbi absolute authority to block the civil divorce, which is unconstitutional.
On behalf of the provision, it may be claimed that judicial deference
to the rabbi resembles civil courts deferring to decisions of religious tribunals when property or other matters of civil consequence turn on the outcome. But no case has allowed a religious authority to prevent someone
from obtaining a basic civil right, such as a divorce. Here, the state assigns the rabbi public authority to determine whether a court should grant a
civil divorce. This allocation of authority cannot be granted, even if the
20 6
issue to which the rabbi speaks is almost always a simple factual one.
This feature does not undermine the whole scheme, but is itself unconstitutional.
How should a court correct this provision? The certification of the
rabbi should be given presumptive weight but not final authority. Husbands will rarely have strong arguments that they have removed obstacles
if rabbis say otherwise. When husbands do contradict rabbis, courts can
accept a rabbi's judgment on debatable questions.2 0 7 Thus, courts should
be able to proceed without assigning rabbis final authority and without
themselves trying to resolve debatable matters of religious law.
One other complication alters the "basic scheme." Taken together,
the law's provisions either (1) treat affidavits by husbands as conclusively
accurate, capable of being trumped only by denials of marrying rabbis, or
(2) call on courts to make decisions about the removal of barriers to remarriage. When such decisions are difficult, they would entangle the state
with religion more than would straightforward factual determinations.
Deference to the marrying rabbi's determination is one acceptable way to
avoid difficult decisions. When the marrying rabbi is unavailable, a court
should be able to reject a husband's affidavit if it is patently false.
205. The language of the statute suggests that the only challenge to the truthfulness of an affidavit can be in a prosecution for making a false sworn statement. See BREITowrrz, supra note 100, at
183.
206. Breitowitz defends the provision for a clergy "veto" after having fast indicated doubt about
what a court is supposed to do under the statute if the husband's and rabbi's affidavits conflict. See id.

at 196-97.
207. An alternative resolution would be for a court to accept a husband's assertions that he has
complied with the statute by taking all steps if his claim can be defeated only by a debatable interpretation of Jewish law. This may seem like the best way the court can avoid inappropriate decisions

about religious governance without granting too much civil authority to the marrying rabbi. But
courts do give religious tribunals nearly determinative authority to decide matters that essentially settle claims of church property. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976). Deferring to a rabbi's judgment on debatable matters is probably acceptable.
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2. The EquitableDistributionLaw
The equitable distribution law of 1992 avoids the possibly arbitrary
limitation to religious marriages and the assignment of civil authority to
rabbis, but one of its features raises a problem not present in the 1983
statute. From the standpoint of Jewish law, enforcement of the 1992 law
may involve unacceptable duress by imposing a loss, 20 8 and this creates a
potential constitutional issue. If the alternative to an invalid get is no get
at all, the civil law has done no harm. But perhaps a husband would have
given a get without civil duress. It is even arguable that if a civil statute
specifies coercive consequences for a category of circumstances, all gittin
granted in those circumstances would be invalid (under Jewish law) because duress looms in the background and its actual effect cannot be
gauged.20 9 Were the civil law to end up rendering a large percentage of
gittin (religiously) invalid, the law would be amazingly counterproductive,
with a powerful negative effect on religion.
How serious is this concern? Given the intricacies regarding the appropriateness of serious pressure on husbands and the disagreements
among Orthodox and Conservative Jews about the limits of acceptable
pressure, an assessment is not easy.2 10 A court should consider the claim
that a statute undermines religious law in this way, but it cannot enter the
thicket of debatable issues of Jewish law. Even if it discerns that substantial groups believe a statutory scheme undermines gittin that might have
been granted in the absence of civil pressure, it should not strike down the
provision on this ground if opinion within the Orthodox and Conservative
21
communities is divided. '
For standard civil constitutional analysis, the other issues concerning
interference with religion are similar in the new and old statutes. In certain
applications, the equitable distribution provision is easier to defend. Insofar as the inability to remarry affects a wife's prospective financial status,
courts appropriately take her failure to obtain a get as bearing on her financial future.2 12 That rationale does not cover a court's responding puni208. If civil law imposes unacceptable duress, then from a religious viewpoint, the get a husband
grants will be invalid. See BRErrowrrz, supra note 100, at 212-19.
209.
See Nadel, supra note 163, at 97; Zomberg, supra note 103, at 757-58 (reporting a telephone interview with Rabbi J. David Bleich).
210. See BR=Towrrz,supra note 100; Zomberg, supranote 103, at 756-59.
211. See Becher v. Becher, 667 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 1997); Cerisse Anderson, Consideration
of Religious Divorce Upheld,N.Y. L. J., March 18, 1997, at 1.
212. See Zomberg, supra note 103, at 734 (stating that "the policy underlying the 1992 amend-

ment is that, in order for courts equitably to divide marital assets and set maintenance, they must be
able to consider the financial implications of one party's inability to remarry").
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tively to a husband's unfairness or its employing the lever that it will impose an unfavorable settlement unless a husband grants a get. When a
court acts for these reasons, the constitutional problems of affecting relig2 13
ion are at least as great as they are for the earlier statute.
In summary, statutes designed to induce husbands to go through Jew-

ish divorces do present serious constitutional issues, but the basic features
of those statutes should be accepted. 2 14 Some details raise further problems, and the assignment of final authority to marrying rabbis in the 1983
law should be regarded as constitutionally impermissible.
E. EQuITY

When courts act on their own motion, the constitutional issues are
closely similar to those generated by legislation. In some cases, courts
have invoked equitable principles effectively to preclude a husband's
achieving an unfair advantage by refusing to grant a get. A New Jersey
court, reviewing an unfavorable settlement that a wife signed to obtain her

husband's consent to a get, held the settlement invalid as a consequence of
duress. 2 15 A New York court refused to grant a husband equitable distri-

bution of property because he had "unclean hands"; his "unclean hands"
consisted of misusing his differential power by refusing to grant a get.216
The court subsequently gave the husband a smaller share of the marital
wealth because he continued to refuse to grant a get.2 17 An earlier Appellate Division case held that a husband's oppressive misuse of his power to
213. As I discuss in connection with common law equity, perhaps a defendant who resists a civil
divorce has a stronger argument against being pressured than a plaintiff who wants one. In New York,
in contrast with virtually every other state, the only grounds for unilateral divorce involve fault.
Thus, the defendant husband resisting a divorce sought by his wife will have committed some fault if
his wife is to succeed. His fault (according to civil law) may reduce the attractiveness of his claim that
he should not be pressured into giving a get. (As note 196, supra, suggests, a plaintiff seeking a civil
divorce but genuinely wishing to remain married under religious law also has some claim that pressure
is improper.) The fact that other states allow unilateral divorce without fault might make legislatures
hesitant to adopt a statute that covers defendants in the way the 1992 provision does.
214. For a recent case accepting the 1992 provision, see Becher, 667 N.Y.S.2d 50, decided below by a judge who said that he has seen the coercive withholding of a get on occasions "'too numerous to count."' See Anderson, supranote 211, at 4. In one case, a branch of the New York Supreme
Court held the 1983 law invalid as a violation of the Obligations of Contracts Clause as applied to a
separation agreement entered into before the law was passed. See Chambers v. Chambers, 471
N.Y.S.2d 958 (Super. Ct. 1983).
215. See Segal v. Segal, 650 A.2d 996 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1994).
216. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 583 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1992).
217. See Blocking a Religious Divorce Proves Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at B4. For a
comparable British case, see Brett v. Brett, 1 All E.R. 1007 (C.A. 1969). See also Segal, 650 A.2d at
998-99; Schwartz, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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218
withhold a get subjected the bargain that followed to potential revision.
(The same court declined to hold that withholding a religious divorce
constituted a tort.)

Generalizing about these kinds of cases is hard, because so much depends on particular circumstances. The argument for equitable relief from
an agreed settlement is strongest when husbands have explicitly bargained
with their power to withhold a get in order to obtain more favorable terms.
Perhaps a secular state should have no policy about imbalances of power
for religious divorces viewed in isolation; but the state rightly determines
should not benefit the stronger
that the leverage provided by an imbalance
2 19
settlement.
divorce
civil
party in the
Whether equitable relief should be given if the husband has never
agreed to obtain a get and has never bargained about it is more difficult.
When a husband simply refuses to provide a get, should the state treat his
wife more generously than it otherwise would? As I noted in respect to
New York's 1992 statute, such treatment is undoubtedly proper insofar as
it is based on the wife's having bleaker financial prospects. The serious
questions arise when the court goes further to pressure the husband to
grant a get or to penalize him for failing to do so. If the husband himself
seeks a civil divorce, the constitutional issues about judicial use of equity
are the same as under the New York statutes. A defendant husband who
resists a divorce has a somewhat stronger argument that the state should
not indirectly coerce him to give a get by diminishing his share of the settlement. Since, unlike New York, other states permit unilateral divorce
without fault, courts will sometimes deal with faultless husbanddefendants. Such defendants have the strongest appeal against being coerced into contributing to a religious divorce they do not want. Nevertheless, on balance, the constitutionality of civil law prodding to grant a get
is a plaintiff or defendant, or on
should not depend on whether the husband
220
fault.
"at
be
to
found
is
whether he
218.
219.

See Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372 (App. Div. 1987).
Whatever conceivable claim a husband may have to religious liberty dissipates if he trades

off his ability to withhold a get for a bigger share of the marital property.
220. Pressuring a party who actually does not want a civil divorce, especially if he is not at fault,
may be a greater impairment than pressuring someone who seeks a divorce. However, the status of
parties in modem divorce practice and the content of what is alleged as fault, is often too contingent

on nonessentials for these variations to make a crucial constitutional difference.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 71:781

F. TORT
Another way in which civil courts might act on their own is to allow a
wife recovery in tort law for a husband's refusal to grant a get. The most
apt form of action is the tort called the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 22 1 This involves the intentional or reckless causing of severe
emotional suffering by outrageous conduct. Many wives who are divorced
civilly but denied a religious divorce undoubtedly suffer greatly. Some
husbands may actually wish to impose such suffering. Even those who do
not are probably aware that suffering is substantially likely, and this
awareness is sufficient to support a finding of recklessness. 222 Is the behavior outrageous? That is the most troublesome question. If the husband
acts purely from spite, one could comfortably conclude that his effort to
prevent a remarriage for his wife and to cause her acute distress is outrageous. 223 If the husband has a genuine religious objection to the get procedure or some other conviction that he should not participate, his conduct
should not be treated as outrageous.
The most difficult case is one in which a husband withholds a get in
order to get a better bargain in the civil divorce. Bitter negotiations are a
common, if unfortunate, element of many modem divorces. Might one say
it is outrageous to use as a bargaining chip something one does not personally care about, such as withholding a get? It is not unusual for spouses
to claim they want something (such as custody of children) that they really
do not, in order to be able to "concede" this in return for something they
do want.
If such bargaining were often treated as raising claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, divorcing couples might "up the ante" in
conflicts already full of emotional hostility. Should courts make a judgment that bargaining about the get is especially unfair, and therefore outrageous? Although this is a possible outcome, I do not think bargaining tactics employing the get should be given this special status for purposes of
tort law. Thus, I am inclined to believe that tort recovery should be limited
to circumstances in which the husband's motivations are clearly spiteful.
221. See BRErrowrrz, supra note 100, at 239-49; Glick, supra note 129, at 906-13; Zomberg,
supra note 103, at 726-27.
222. The recklessness of an act depends not only on the risk of harm but also on a lack of justification for the act. A husband with a strong objection to granting a get might claim that he was aware
of the risk to the wife but was not reckless. In any instance, however, in which the husband's behavior was outrageous, he would lack such ajustification.
223. I put aside the possibility that the husband may claim that his actions may be a justified response to his wife's malicious behavior towards him.
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G. CONCLUSION ABOUT CIVIL PRESSURE TO GRANT A GET

Although the constitutional issues are difficult, I conclude that states
may appropriately aim to encourage recalcitrant husbands to give wives
the gittin necessary for remarriage within Orthodox and Conservative religious communities. The state's secular interest in freedom to remarry
and its interest in accommodating religious exercise are strong enough to
support such encouragement. However, these interests probably do not
override a husband's claim of religious exercise in the unusual instance
when a husband has a genuine opposition of religious conscience to submitting to a beth din or providing a get. Whether a state should take the
step of adopting a statute or remain within the limits of common law and
equity will depend on the capacity of courts to address the problem within
the constraints of judge-made law. One straightforward mode of judicial
involvement is enforcement of prior agreements. When husbands have
clearly agreed to civil law enforcement of a promise to submit to a beth
din, courts should regard themselves as free to compel performance so
long as they need not resolve any debated issues of Jewish law.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Drawing together the threads of this analysis helps reveal the broader
lessons to be learned from this close study of two problems about civil law
and Jewish law. Those lessons are highly relevant to the free exercise and
establishment principles the Supreme Court should build from the residue
of existing doctrines about rights to religious exercise, unconstitutional effects on religion, and unacceptable connections of secular and clerical
authority.
A. SPECIFIC DOCTRINAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Civil determination of debatable issues of religious law is generally unacceptable; 224 but straightforward determinations of religious requirements by civil courts may be appropriate if these determinations serve
secular interests. Just as the priest-penitent privilege and civil deference to
religious tribunals demand some recognition of religious law, so also do
typical kosher laws and civil pressure in regard to gittin. But recognition
of religious law does not by itself render these civil involvements unconstitutional.
224.

See Jones v. Volf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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2. Similarly, civil pressure to perform acts of religious obligation
may be permissible so long as secular reasons exist for performance of the
acts (reasons other than the social desirability of people practicing religions). Thus, the fact that a husband may feel some religious obligation to
grant a get once ordered to do so by a beth din does not make civil pressure on him to grant the get unconstitutional.
3. The strict compelling interest test, applicable when there is a direct
attack on a religion or conscious discrimination among religions, is
probably not applicable when the government promotes a secular interest
225
in a manner that may cause some religion comparative disadvantage.
These situations should be dealt with under other Establishment Clause
principles.
4. In determining whether a religion is impermissibly assisted, a
court should ask whether other groups have similar needs that are unmet.
Thus, kosher and get laws do not aid Orthodox Jews impermissibly against
Reform Jews, who do not observe kosher standards or engage in religious
divorces.
5. Ordinarily, despite some language in Supreme Court opinions, a
possibility of a future failure to extend the same benefit to another similar
group should not render a benefit unconstitutional. One can never be sure
what legislatures will do or what claims religious groups may develop.
Thus, if the legislature confers a benefit, such as the protection against
fraud that kosher laws provide, it is always conceivable that a similar
group will arise and not be similarly treated. If that possibility were alone
sufficient to render the initial benefit unconstitutional, legislatures could
not act to give benefits 226-even essentially secular benefits-that are focused on any particular religious community. Such benefits are not always
invalid.
If, in contrast, such focused laws are unconstitutional, legislatures
could respond by adopting generally worded laws, such as the New York
get provisions, that would cover other similarly situated groups as they
arise. With ingenuity, a legislative drafter could find general language to
cover food requirements of various religions, leaving it to administrators to
concentrate on kosher requirements.
225.

However, if a state prefers Orthodox views of kosher over Conservative ones, that prefer-

ence probably does amount to conscious discrimination.
226. More strictly, they could not give benefits that were not already required by the Constitution or by a generally worded statute like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
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6. In an Establishment Clause analysis of whether effects are acceptable, the feasibility of alternative schemes that generate fewer negative effects should be relevant. "Least restrictive means" was a familiar component of free exercise analysis before Employment Division v. Smith and is
an aspect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Alternative means
should also make a difference when courts review Establishment Clause
challenges. This point is strikingly illustrated with respect to kosher enforcement. Civil determinations of kosher requirements present definite
constitutional difficulties. Whether these difficulties should be swallowed
depends partly on whether civil enforcement of fraud related to product
certification by private groups will provide consumers adequate protection.
A court's confidence that state support of private enforcement will work
effectively is one reason to hold that more extensive state involvement is
unconstitutional. A scheme with a sincerity defense accommodates diverse religious views better than one without the defense, but it does not
wholly eliminate the difficulties with state determination of what is kosher.
7. A plain effect within religious law could bear on constitutionality
under civil law. Notably, if state pressure on husbands to grant gittin
plainly rendered their acts ineffective under Jewish law, a strong ground
would exist for concluding that the law is in paradoxical opposition to its
aim and "inhibits" religion unacceptably.
8. For most free exercise purposes, the religious views that count are
those of the person or persons advancing the free exercise claim, regardless of whether those views are widely shared by others. 227 Thus, a husband could raise a serious free exercise objection to being pressured to
grant a get if doing so would violate his religious conscience. However, if
only a very small percentage of persons in a regulated class have sincere
religious objections, and determining sincerity is very difficult when
members of the class have a substantial incentive to claim such objections
falsely, courts might reasonably decide not to accede to such objections.
They might conclude instead that the government has a compelling interest
in not making any exceptions.
9. For establishment purposes, it is the views of people more generally that matter. This is true whether one asks about advancing or inhibiting religion, or endorsement. If a court asks whether kosher laws aid or
endorse Orthodox Judaism in comparison with Conservative Judaism, the
227. However, if someone objects to government activity that reduces the religious value of a
site (such as a sacred mountain), one individual's sincere feelings on that score will not be very important if most members of his religious group see things differently.
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views of most Conservative Jews rather than those of isolated individuals
matter. If the great majority of Conservatives who observe kosher actually
welcome enforcement of Orthodox standards, such enforcement may be
concluded not to unacceptably disadvantage Conservative practice. Similarly, if most Orthodox and Conservative Jews want the state to pressure
husbands to grant gittin, that is evidence that the law does not "inhibit"
those religions. No doubt, courts are not well suited to figure out exactly
how many members of a religion take particular positions, but they should
be able to discern existing heavily dominant opinion on these subjects.
10. For endorsement analysis, the relevant comparison may concern
the relative position of two minority religions (or two branches of one minority religion). It is a stretch to think of kosher or get laws as having
much, if anything, to do with the place of Christians in relation to Jews. If
any endorsement (or condemnation) exists, it is of one branch of Judaism
vis-h-vis another. Such an endorsement is undoubtedly possible-a legislature that is mostly Christian might effectively endorse some branch of
another religious tradition as authoritative. The major opinions employing
endorsement analysis have thus far proceeded as if the views of a hypothetical reasonable person of no distinct religious understanding determine
whether a law, in purpose or effect, endorses a religion. If that approach is
applied to the problems I have discussed, the relevant reasonable person
would need to evaluate how members of the minority religions would
likely react to the legislature's actions. It is difficult to envision this without inquiry into how actual members of those religions do react. A nonJewish judge who tries to replicate the reasonable observer will be hard
pressed to assess how a reasonable Conservative Jew who observes kosher
requirements will regard enforcement of Orthodox standards without some
228
knowledge of the position of Conservative Jews.
11. Endorsement analysis sometimes seems very close to more general analysis of advancements of religion, but this is not invariably so. If
one asks whether typical kosher laws aid Orthodoxy over Conservatism,
one will look to their effect on Conservative practice and perhaps at how
Conservative Jews regard the laws. These factors will also bear on
whether the state has endorsed Orthodoxy. On the other hand, the argument that the get law impermissibly aids Orthodoxy by moderating the
harsh effects of one of its practices seems to have little bearing on en228. I am contending implicitly that reflective Christians will have a better sense of how Christians and others will react to a cross in a courthouse than of how members of branches of nonChrisfian
religions regard subjects unfamiliar to Christians. (I, in fact, doubt that most Christians have an adequate sense of how Christian symbols affect members of other religions.)
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dorsement. For areas of establishment law other than public symbols (for
which endorsement is already the dominant approach), it remains an open
question how significant a role endorsement analysis will play. As this
question is addressed, courts need to think carefully about when endorsement terminology is closely similar to other inquiries about aid and when
the questions are genuinely different.
12. Reliance on decisions of rabbis about matters of Jewish law is a
reasonable response to the difficulty of ordinary civil officials making decisions about Jewish law and to the unconstitutionality of such officials resolving debatable questions of religious law. But it is not permissible for
rabbis, as clergy, to be the public officials who make final determinations
for the state under kosher enforcement laws. Nor may the state assign private rabbis unreviewable authority over whether people can acquire civil
divorces, or other fundamental legal privileges. The way to avoid this dilemma is for civil officials to defer to the decisions of religious authorities
(including individual rabbis) on subjects of religious law, but not to confer
ultimate civil authority upon them. Among the various ways this can be
done, a court can treat a beth din as it might some other civil arbitrator, accepting its judgments about the Jewish law of divorce.
B. OvERALL SUMMARY
These individual conclusions illustrate the complexity of considerations that bear on how civil law should permissibly involve itself in matters of religious significance. The aspiration for simple approaches is either deluded or badly misguided. It is deluded if a proponent believes
simple approaches will yield results sensitive to the nuances of our religious and social life. It is misguided if a proponent recognizes the Procrustean quality of simple approaches, but thinks their clarity and determinacy
are worth the price of unhappy outcomes.

